which brings the god to shelter. All such claims, apparently the highest, are low and constitute a disparagement of beyng! (Cf. The grounding, 230. Truth and correctness.)
The appropriating event and its joining in the abyss of time-space form the net in which the last god is self-suspended in order to rend the net and let it end in its uniqueness, divine and rare and the strangest amid all beings.
The sudden extinguishing of the great fire-this leaves behind something which is neither day nor night, which no one grasps, and in which humans, having come to the end, still bustle about so as to benumb themselves with the products of their machinations, pretending such products are made for all eternity, perhaps for that "and so forth" which is neither day nor night
as appropriating event. The ap-propriation destines the human being to be the property of beyng.
Then is beyng in fact the other, something over and against the event? No; for property is belongingness to the ap-propriation, and the latter itself constitutes beyng.
To be sure, the event must never be represented immediately and objectively. The appropriation is the oscillation between humans and gods and is precisely this "between" itself and its essential occurrence which is grounded through and in Da-sein.
The god is neither a "being" nor a "nonbeing" and is also not to be identified with beyng. Instead, beyng essentially occurs in the manner of time-space as that "between" which can never be grounded in the god and also not in the human being (as some objectively present, living thing) but only in Da-sein.
Beyng and the essential occurrence of its truth are of humans, insofar as the human being becomes steadfast as Da-sein. That is as much as to say: beyng does not essentially occur by the grace of humans, by the mere fact that humans occur.
Beyng "is" of humans in such a way that beyng itself needs the human being as the preserver of the site of the moment for the absconding and advent of the gods.
It is futile to try to set beyng off in relief against just any random being, especially since "just any being," if experienced only as something true, is already in each case the other of itself but is not just any other as the opposite belonging intrinsically to it. The other refers instead to that which, as a sheltering of the truth of being, lets beings be beings.