358 II. 3
Being and Time

which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without Illusions into the resoluteness of 'taking action'. Neither does anticipatory resoluteness stem from 'idealistic' exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factically the basic possibilities for Dasein. Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining 'incidentals' with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself—primarily from the events of the world.1 But the analysis of these basic moods would transgress the limits which we have drawn for the present Interpretation by aiming towards fundamental ontology.

Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological Interpretation of Dasein's existence ? That is so indeed. But not only is this Fact one which must not be denied and which we are forced to grant; it must also be conceived in its positive necessity, in terms of the object which we have taken as the theme of our investigation. Philosophy will never seek to deny its 'presuppositions', but neither may it simply admit them. It conceives them, and it unfolds with more and more penetration both the presuppositions themselves and that for which they are presuppositions. The methodological considerations now demanded of us will have this very function.


63. The Hermeneutical Situation at which we have Arrived for Interpreting the Meaning of the Being of Care; and the Methodological Character of the Existential Anarytic in General2

In its anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein has now been made phenomenally visible with regard to its possible authenticity and totality. The hermeneutical Situationiv which was previously inadequate for interpreting the meaning of the Being of care, now has the required primordiality. Dasein has been put into that which we have in advance, and this has been done primordially-that is to say, this has been done with regard to its authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole; the idea of existence, which guides us as that which we see in advance, has been made definite by the clarification of our ownmost potentiality-for-Being; and, now that we have concretely worked out the structure of Dasein's Being, its peculiar ontological character has become so plain as compared with everything present-at-hand, that Dasein's existentiality has been grasped in advance


1 'In ihr wird das Dasein frei von den "Zufälligkeiten" des Unterhaltenwerdens die sich die geschäftige Neugier primär aus den Weltbegebenheiten verschafft.'

2 ' Die fur eine Interpretation des Seinssinnes der Sorge gewonnene hermeneutische Situation und der methodisck Charakter der existenzialen Analytik überhaupt. '