269 I. 6
Being and Time

situation to 'broaden' the conception of truth in the λόγος to include pure νοεῖν. The truth of αἲσθησις and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the primordial kind of uncovering. And only because νόησις primarily uncovers, can the λόγος as διανοεῖν also have uncovering as its function.

Not only is it wrong to invoke Aristotle for the thesis that the genuine 'locus' of truth lies in the judgment; even in its content this thesis fails to recognize the structure of truth. Assertion is not the primary 'locus' of truth. On the contrary, whether as a mode in which uncoveredness is appropriated or as a way of Being-in-the-world, assertion is grounded in Dasein's uncovering, or rather in its disclosedness. The most primordial 'truth' is the 'locus' of assertion; it is the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be either true or false—that they may uncover or cover things up.

Truth, understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. The term signifies an existentiale. But herewith we have already sketched out our answers to the question of what kind of Being truth possesses, and to the question of in what sense it is necessary to presuppose that 'there is truth'.

(c) The Kind of Being which Truth Possesses, and the Presupposition of Truth

Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is a kind of Being which is essential to Dasein. 'There is' truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed. Newton's laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatever —these are true only as long as Dasein is. Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, cannot be. Before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not 'true'; it does not follow that they were false, or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any longer possible. Just as little does this 'restriction' imply that the Being-true of 'truths' has in any way been diminished.

To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were. Such uncovering is the kind of Being which belongs to 'truth'.

That there are 'eternal truths' will not be adequately proved until