233 I. 6
Being and Time

Being to which Dasein as Being-in-the-world has been delivered over.

That about which anxiety is anxious reveals itself as that in the face of which it is anxious-namely, Being-in-the-world. The selfsameness of that in the face of which and that about which one has anxiety, extends even to anxiousness [Sichängsten] itself. For, as a state-of-mind, anxiousness is a basic kind of Being-in-the-world. Here the disclosure and the disclosed are existentially selfsame in such a way that in the latter the world has been disclosed as world, and Being-in has been disclosed as a potentiality-for-Being which is individualized, pure, and thrown; this makes it plain that with the phenomenon of anxiety a distinctive state-of-mind has become a theme for Interpretation. Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as 'solus ipse'. But this existential 'solipsism' is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subjectThing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world.

Again everyday discourse and the everyday interpretation of Dasein furnish our most unbiased evidence that anxiety as a basic state-of-mind is disclosive in the manner we have shown. As we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest 'how one is'. In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'.1 Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the "nothing and nowhere". But here "uncanniness" also means "not-being-at-home" [das Nichtzuhause- sein]. In our first indication of the phenomenal character of Dasein's basic state and in our clarification of the existential meaning of "Being-in" as distinguished from the categorial signification of 'insideness', Being-in was defined as "residing alongside . . . ", "Being-familiar with . . ."II This character ofBeing-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness of the "they", which brings tranquillized self-assurance—'Being-at-home', with all its obviousness-into the average everydayness of Dasein.III On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential 'mode' of the "not-at-home". Nothing else is meant by our talk about 'uncanniness'.

By this time we can see phenomenally what falling, as fleeing, flees in the face of. It does not flee in the face of entities within-the-world; these are precisely what it flees towards—as entities alongside which our concern,

1 'Befindlichkeit, so wurde früher gesagt, macht off en bar, "wie einem ist". In der Angst ist einem "unheimlich".' The reference is presumably to H. 134 above. While 'unheimlich' is here translated as 'uncanny', it means more literally 'unhomelike', as the author proceeds to point out.