Problem of Ontological Difference [378-380]

temporalizing of the only time of which the common understanding of time is aware and which we designate generally as the irreversible sequence of nows.

We shall not now enter into further detail regarding the connection between the phenomenon of intentionality and that of ecstatic-horizonal temporality. Intentionality—being directed toward something and the intimate connection of intentio and intentum present in it—which is commonly spoken of in phenomenology as the ultimate primal phenomenon has the condition of its possibility in temporality and temporality's ecstatic horizonal character. The Dasein is intentional only because it is determined essentially by temporality. The Dasein's essential determination by which it intrinsically transcends is likewise connected with the ecstatic-horizonal character. How these two characters, intentionality and transcendence, are interconnected with temporality will become apparent to us. At the same time we shall understand how ontology, by making being its theme, is a transcendental science. But first, since we did not expressly interpret temporality by way of the Dasein, we must make the phenomenon more familiar to ourselves.

δ) The derivation of the structural moments of now-time
from ecstatic-horizonal temporality. The mode of being of
falling as the reason for the covering up of original time

The conception of time as a now-sequence is not aware of the derivation of this time from original time and overlooks all the essential features belonging to the now-sequence as such. As commonly understood. time is intrinsically a free-floating sequence of nows. It is simply there; its givenness must be acknowledged. Now that we have characterized temporality in a rough way, the question arises whether we can let the now-sequence arise out of original temporality, with explicit reference to the essential structures—significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness. If time temporalizes itself as a now-sequence from out of the original temporality, then these structures must become ontologically intelligible by way of the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality . What is more, if the temporality in which time temporalizes itself as now-sequence constitutes the Dasein's ontological constitution, and if the factical Dasein experiences and knows time first and primarily only as it is commonly understood, then we should also be able to explain by recourse to the Dasein's temporality why factical Dasein knows time primarily only as now-sequence and. further, why the common understanding of time either overlooks or does not suitably understand time's essential structural moments of significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness. If it is possible—if indeed it is even necessary—to show that what is commonly known as time springs from what we have characterized as temporality, then this justifies calling that from which