Introduction The Theme and Method of the Lecture Course 1. Nature and history as domains of objects for the sciences 2. Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of history and nature under the guidance of the history of the concept of time 3. Outline of the lecture course
Chapter One Emergence and Initial Breakthrough of Phenomenological Research 4. The situation of philosophy in the second half of the 19th century, Philosophy and the sciences a) The position of positivism b) Neo-Kantianism--the rediscovery of Kant in the philosophy of science c) Critique of positivism--Dilthey's call for an independent method for the human sciences d) The trivilizing of Dilthey's inquiry by Windelband and Rickert. e) Philosophy as 'scientific philosophy'--psychology as the basic science of philosophy (the theory of consciousness) α Franz Brentano β Edmund Husserl Chapter Two The Fundamental Discoveries of Phenomenology, Its Principle, and the Clarification of Its Name 5. Intentionality a) Intentionality as the structure of lived experiences: exposition and initial elucidation b) Rickert's misunderstanding of phenomenology and intentionality c) The basic constitution of intentionality as such α The perceived of perceiving: the entity in itself (environmental thing, natural thing, thinghood) β The perceived of perceiving: the how of being-intended (the perceivedness of the entity, the feature of bodily-there) γ Initial indication of the basic mode of intentionality as the belonging together of intentio and intentum 6. Categorical Intuition a) Intentional presuming and intentional fulfillment α Identification as demonstrative fulfillment β Evidence as Identifying fulfillment γ Truth as demonstrative identification δ Truth and being b) Intuition and expression α Expression of perceptions β Simple and multi-level acts c) Acts of synthesis d) Acts of ideation α Averting misunderstandings β The significance of this discovery 7. The original sense of the apriori 8. The principal of phenomenology a) The meaning of the maxim "to the matters themselves" b) Phenomenology's understanding of itself as analytic description of intentionality in its apriori 9. Clarification of the name 'phenomenology' a) Clarification of the original sense of the component parts of the name α The original sense of φαινόμενον β Original sense of λόγος, λόγος ἀποφαντικός and λόγος σημαντικός b) Definition of the unified meaning thus obtained and the research corresponding to it c) Correcting a few typical misunderstandings of phenomenology which stem from its name Chapter Three The Early Development of Phenomenological Research and the Necessity of a Radical Reflection in and from Itself 10. Elaboration of the thematic field: the fundamental determination of intentionality a) Explication of the demarcation of the thematic field of phenomenology and fixation of the working horizons in Husserl and Scheler b) Fundamental reflection upon the regional stucture of the field in its originality: elaboration of pure consciousness as an independent region of being 11. Immanent critique of phenomenological research: critical discussion of the four determinations of pure conciousness a) Consciousness is immanent being b) Consciousness is absolute being in the sense of absolute giveness c) Consciousness is absolutely given in the sense of 'nulla re indigent ad existendum' d) Consciousness is pure being 12. Exposition of the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional as the basic field of phenomenological research 13. Exposition of the neglect of the question of the sense of being itself and of the being of man in phenomenology a) The necessary demarcation of phenomenology from naturalistic psychology, and its overcoming b) Dilthey's endeavour of a 'personalistic psychology'--his idea of man as a person c) Husserl's adoption of the personalistic tendency in the "Logos-Essay" d) Fundamental critique of personalistic psychology on a phenomenological basis e) Scheler's unsuccessful attempt in determining the mode of the being of acts and of the performer of acts f) Result of the critical reflection: the neglect of the question of being as such and of the being of the intentional is grounded in the fallenness of Dasein itself
Chapter One The Phenomenology That Is Grounded in the Question of Being 14. Exposition of the question of being from the radically understood sense of the phenomenological principle a) Assumption of the tradition as a genuine repitition b) Modification of the thematic field, the scientific way of treating it and the previous self-understanding of phenomenology by critical reflection on the fundamental question of being as such c) Unfolding the question of being with time as our guiding clue Chapter Two Elaboration of the Question of Being in Terms of an Initial Explication of Dasein 15. Emergence of the question of being from an indeterminate preunderstanding of Dasien--question of being and understanding of being 16. Interrogative structure of the question of being 17. Correlation of the question of being and the quetioning entity (Dasein) Chapter Three The Most Immediate Explication of Dasein Starting from its Everydayness. The Basic Constitution of Dasein as Bing-in-the-World 18. Acquisition of the fundamental structures of the basic constitution of Dasein a) The Dasein is in the 'to be it at its time' b) The Dasein is the 'to be' of everydayness for its particular while 19. The basic constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The in-being of Dasein and the being-in of things on hand 20. Knowing as a derivative mode of the in-being of Dasein 21. Worldhood of the world a) Worldhood as the wherein for Dasein's leeway of encounter b) Worldhood of the environing world: aroundness, the primary character of the space of the "around" as constitutive of worldhood 22. How the tradition passed over the question of the worldhood of the world. Descartes as an example 23. Positive expositionof the basic structure of the worldhood of the world a) Analysis of the characters of encounter of the world (reference, referential totality, familiarity, 'one') b) Interpretations of the structure of encounter of the environing world: the phenomenal correlation founding the characters of encounter themselves α The work-world: more detailed phenomenological interpretation of the environing world of concern β Characterization of the specific function of encounter of this work-world for encountering the nearest things in the environing world--the specific character of reality of the handy γ The specific function of encounter of the work-world for letting us encounter that which is always already there-- the extant on hand c) Determination of the basic structure of worldhood as meaningfulness α Misinterpretation of the phenomenon of reference as substance and function β Sense of the structure of encounter belonging to world as meaningfulness γ Interconnection of the phenomenon of meaningfulness, sign, reference, and relation the extant on hand δ Being-in-the-world, as concerned and understanding discloses the world as meaningfulness 24. Internal structuring of the question of the reality of the external world a) The reality of the external world is exempt from any proof of it or belief in it b) The reality of the real (worldhood of the world) cannot be defined on the basis of its being an object and being apprehended c) Reality is not interpreted by way of the in-itself; rather, this character is itself in need of interpretation d) Reality is not understood primarily in terms of the bodily presence of the perceived e) Reality is not adeuately clarified by the phenomenon of resistance as the object of drive and effort 25. Spatiality of the world a) Highlighting of the phenomenal structure of aroundness as such is constituted by: remotion, region, orientation (directionality) b) The primary spatiality of Dasein itself: remotion, region, orientation are determinations of the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world c) Spatializing the environing world and its space--space and extension in mathematical determination using Leibniz as an example 26. The 'who' of being-in-the-world a) Dasein as being-with--the being of others as co-Dasein (critique of the thematic of empathy) b) The Anyone as the who of the being of with-one-another in everydayness Chapter Four A More Original Explication of In-Being: The Being of Dasein as Care 27. In-being and care--an outline 28. The phenomenon of discoveresness a) Structure of the discoveredness of Dasein in its world: disposition b) Understanding: the enactment of the being of discoveredness c) The cultivation of understanding in interpretation d) Discourse and language α Discourse and hearing β Discourse and silence γ Discourse and idle talk δ Discourse and language 29. Falling as a basic movement of Dasein a) Idle talk b) Curiosity c) Ambiguity d) The characters of the inherent movement of falling e) The fundamental structures of Dasein from the horizon of fallenness 30. The structure of uncanniness a) The phenomenon of flight and fear α Fear as being afraid of something considered in its four essential moments β The modifications of fear γ Fear in the sense of fearing about b) Dread and uncanniness c) More original explication of falling and dread (uncanniness) as a preview of the basic constitution of Dasein as care 31. Care as the being of Dasein a) Determination of the articulated structure of care b) The phenomena of urge and propensity c) Care and dicoverdness d) Care and the character of the 'before' in understanding and interpretation (prepossession, preview, preconception) e) The 'Fable of Cura' as an illustration of an original self-interpretation of Dasein f) Care and intentionality
32. The result and the task of the fundamental analysis of Dasein: elaboration of the question of being itself 33. Necessity for the thematic development of the phenomenological interpretation of Dasein as a whole. The phenomenon of death 34. Phenomenological interpretation of death as a phenomenon of Dasein a) The utmost possibility of death in the mode of being of everydayness b) The authentic relationship of the being of Dasein toward death 35. The phenomenon of willing to have a conscience and of being guilty 36. Time as the being in which Dasein can be its totality
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