The fear of death is the fear of the event, of the instant that is impossible to experience. In this sense death is always sudden, always a disruption and interruption. This death is truly deadly. Anxiety, on the other hand, as a consequence of the indefiniteness of death’s “when”, presents dying as being (Being-towards-death) where death is no longer compacted into the terminal instant but lived as “care”.
Sometimes all these seachanges converge in a single philosophical work, particularly in the case of Martin Heidegger. The very starting point of Heidegger’s philosophy—his formulation of human existence as being-in-the-world—places him at odds with Cartesian metaphysics by inserting the “thinking ego” immediately into a world context composed of societies, fellow beings, and nature. He explicitly described the method he adopted in Being and Time as a “hermeneutical phenomenology,” that is, as an interpretive study of human world-experience.
[T]emporality is implicitly conceived in similar ways in computational ontology as it is in digital ontology. Both digital ontology and computational ontology hold time to be an entity within the domain of temporality. In the case of digital ontologists, if they remain in line with Heidegger, time is the everyday ordinary understanding of time that is in some sense a present-at-hand entity.
[T]echnology, as a type of revealing, cannot simply be understood as instrumental. The tool connects up with nature and humans only to the extent that nature and humans are already within this realm of the technological: nature and humans already have machine like aspects— the extent to which we recognize this is due to the type of organizing which technology calls forth.
Every age needs an introduction to Heidegger appropriate for its epoch.MORE
Such knowing has little to do with seeking or finding answers. Rather it is most purely expressed in the act of creative questioning itself. Heidegger frequently says that knowing is an ability to learn, and this ability to learn means an ability to inquire. Heidegger also says that knowing is willing to know, and willing to know is questioning. Indeed, the kind of knowledge Heidegger seeks is only possible through “creative questioning and shaping out of the power of genuine reflection.”
The essential self-masking feature of word processing fits into the logic of Enframing unveiled by Heidegger. Language turned to information within this concealment brings about the danger in the way Enframing is the danger. But where danger lies so does salvation. The forgetting of being, slipped away from this surface of continuous textuality, can be undone by the essential questioning of this technology.
[W]hen Heidegger describes resonance as (foregoing enowning) an “enstrifing of the strife into the strife itself,” he is discussing the ceaseless struggle of wills to power that have as their consequences the signs we cannot help but use; he is discussing the face of a language and not one of its masks.
According to Heidegger, light can therefore be seen as illumination, as “brightness,” but it can also be understood with regard to its relationship to truth, to unhiddenness, to liberation, and to freedom. Light is more than just brightness, than illumination; it is what (if we may be allowed to create our own Heideggerian turn of phrase) “lets-things-be-seen-in-their-unhiddenness.”
The clearing, as I imagine and describe it, connects with a larger‐scale clearing in which a literature of settler indigenisation appears, literature that is concerned with theorising memory, concealment and place in local, national and transnational contexts.
Translated by Greg Johnson
Nihilism, in Heidegger’s eyes, represents the consequence and the accomplishment of a slow trend toward the oblivion of Being, which begins with Socrates and Plato, continues in Christianity and Western metaphysics, and triumphs in modern times. The essence of nihilism “rests in the oblivion of Being”. Nihilism is the oblivion of Being in realized form. It is the reign of nothingness.
A guide to Heidegger's Basic WritingsMORE
So—to make this long story short—Heidegger proceeds over the years, guided especially by Aristotle’s insight into the kinetic character of things, to unfold his understanding of Being itself—that is, the fundamental, unifying, and originary meaning of Being—as the Being-way wherein and whereby beings emerge, linger in their full ‘look’ or ‘presence’ (eidos), wane, and pass away.
The relation between all these factors radiates a uniqueness of presence, which engages different dimensions of human interest. This engagement is not that of the appropriation of resources, but rather a care for the work in its own character as sculpted being. Through this character an horizon of reverence and insight constellates around the sculpture. The sculptural work is, accordingly, an elemental place-instituting entity, which occupies a distinctive location amongst other things, by creating a relational space of display and interpretative contexts around itself.
What does it mean to suggest that the answer to the question of ‘who is Dasein?’ is the ‘they’ signify, however? From the perspective of everydayness, human existence is heteronomously constituted and manifested not as the ‘I’ assumed by accounts of modern subjectivity, but as ‘anyone’.
Throughout ‘Heidegger’ the sole objective is therefore a Wiederholung or Ereignis, a “retrievingrepeating” of the propriativity that is (human) being. It is a process of re-petition (reseeking) by which one becomes what one is, an appropriation of the movement of appropriation that gathers together Entschlossenheit and Gelassenheit, resolving to release oneself to the projecting that we must do in order for beings to be.
In Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology there is no special meaning attached to the word Ereignis. When he comes to the Philosophy of Revelation, however, the word does take on a special meaning. In Heidegger's Beiträge the word is often hyphenated (Er-eignis), to indicate that he wishes it taken in its deeper etymological sense. Thus, the event is an eye-opener (er-äugen, open up one's eyes to). The word is also made to relate to an-eignen and zu-eignen, which mean make one's own, take to oneself, ap-propriate. In this connection he uses the neologism Er-eignung to indicate that Seyn determines that human beings should become the property (Eigentum) of Seyn as a result of their encounter with (Ent-gegnung), and decision for (Ent-scheidung), Da-sein, the "being" that is very much "there."
Heidegger identifies our purposes as themselves structured within a significance whole that begins at its most basic with what he calls a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. We do things for the sake of something, some purpose, the ultimate purpose being for-thesake- of our own well-being.
The development of Heidegger’s thought can thus be understood in terms of the way he switches the reference of the term ‘Being’ from the unifying structure of entities qua entities to the structure of the givenness of entities as a whole. This is a move from the Being of entities to Being as such, from Sein to Seyn, or from Sein to Ereignis.
Now, we must reject Heidegger’s position both early and late, insofar as in both cases it collapses back into some form of correlationism.
[T]he later Heidegger will use the term Ereignis for the man-meaning bond. That technical term refers to the fact of meaning-giving insofar as it “requires” human being (brauchen) to belong to (zugehören) and sustain that fundamental fact. However, Ereignis is said to “appropriate and own” (ereignen) man as Sein’s own “property” (Eigentum), while in turn making possible man’s proper authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). Do all these metaphors mean that Ereignis is a Super- Something with power to act on human beings? If such a monstrosity is to be avoided at all costs, what then about the later Heidegger’s own quasi-hypostasization of Sein? William J. Richardson answers that question with exquisite délicatesse, “Only truly great philosophers should be indulged for their obscurity.”
Heidegger holds that, because we speak of binary oppositions, they exist in some sense and are, therefore, merely a particular form of being. Because being is that which is common to the two terms of the binary opposition and that which makes it possible to speak of a binary opposition in the first place, being cannot be reduced to one of the terms of a binary opposition; being grounds and so escapes the constraints of binary logic.
Eight essays across the whole of Heidegger's project.MORE
If we distinguish the conceptions of nothing into three basic types, namely, privative, negative, and original nothing, then Heidegger‘s and Daoism‘s conception of nothing can be characterized as ―original nothing‖.
What can we infer from this for the being of digital beings? A digital being is, in the first place, a finite sequence of binary code, consisting perhaps of billions and billions of bits, that is interpreted and calculated by the appropriate hardware in sequences of nested algorithms to bring about a foreseen effect. As binary code, i.e. a string of zeroes and ones, a digital being is nothing other than a finite rational number. And yet, this binary code, interpreted as commands to be processed by a digital processor, brings forth change and movement in the real world of real, physical beings.
It is fitting that Heraclitus, in his day, was referred to as the "dark" one. In many ways he remains dark, but his darkness opens a thinking possibility for us.
To speak of the last God is not disparaging, nor is it blasphemous, nor does it mean the cessation of God. Such interpretations arise only when we think ‘calculatively’. Far from being blasphemous, in speaking of the last God we are addressing the question of the essencing or mode of be-ing (Wesung/Wesen) of the God, indeed we are raising it, Heidegger tells us, to its highest form.
Martin Heidegger famously contends, "Our ordinary perceptual awareness of things is itself interpretive." This contradicts the usual view of modern science—namely, that all knowledge is acquired by objective observation. However, empirical, scientific data has a long history of necessary, and sometimes unfortunate, subjective interpretation. One such case is the hapless tale of the Martian canals.
Now in paperback
This book contains the lectures from two courses at Freiburg, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion from winter semester 1920 and Augustine and Neoplatonism from summer semester 1921.MORE
As a sudden insight, as it was described in conversa- tion with Boss, Ereignis has the character itself of revelation. Since the revelation of Ereignis appears to be a requisite for understand- ing the discourse of the later Heidegger. the Beitrage would be the revealing of revelation itself.
translated by Charles T. Wolfe
My own growing rigid, in this context, has to do with the determination of the origin and the dawn. The Greek morning which Heidegger arranged for us is monomaniacal and kleptomaniacal. It robs an entire array of texts and possibilities so that they may fit under the aegis of Parmenides’ poem.
Dasein, in being exposed to the future, remains essentially un-finished and has to start perpetually anew, Sisyphus-like, in resolving the strife of togetherness. This is a matter of gaining clear insight into the predicament of shared-but-individualized human being situated in the open timespace of being's truth, rather than of ethical appeals or prescriptions. It is timely that we think about this aspect of our propriation by beyng.
Heidegger’s critique of the (robust) correspondence theory of truth places him in a certain proximity to defenders of minimal CT. Heidegger’s primordial truth (aletheia)–not correspondence but revelation, is the removal of a veil (lethe)–defers falsifiability to a penultimate level of discourse.
My claim that phenomenology, and especially the phenomenology of Heidegger, could be used to develop ethical arguments will come as a surprise to some scholars, since Heidegger himself denied ever having such a goal in view. One should not, however, let oneself be misled by Heidegger’s self-characterizations.
Together these experiments show that a smoothly coping participant-tool system can be temporarily disrupted and that this disruption causes a change in the participant's awareness. Since these two events follow as predictions from Heidegger's work, our study offers evidence for the hypothesized transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand.
Translated by Charles H. Seibert
Sculpture would be the embodiment of places. Places, in preserving and opening a region, hold something free gathered around them which grants the tarrying of things under consideration and a dwelling for man in the midst of things.
A new book on crossing to the other beginning with the Beiträge
"An authentic deep concern and reverence for the natural world can only come from a transformed conception of how we see our place and role within the earthly relationship...rooted in an ontological soil in which the experience of existence, of 'being as such', can grow."MORE
The Invental as the ground of the event. Threads of the past are gathered from within that temporal horizon and projected in a unified manner upon what one is practically involved with towards the futural temporal horizon. This projection towards the futural horizon together with the gatheredness of the past creates the unified temporal moment of presencing.
I wanted to spur him to an unguarded opinion about the situation in Germany. I turned the conversation to the controversy in the Neue Ziiricher Zeitung and explained that I agreed neither with Barth's political attack [on Heidegger] nor with Staiger's defense, insofax as I was of the opinion that his partisanship for National Socialism lay in the essence of his philosophy. Heidegger agreed with me without reservation, and added that his concept of "historicity" was the basis of his political "engagement." He also left no doubt about his belief in Hitler.
Imagine this: a home without cheddar cheese, Marmite, baked beans and tea bags. Not homely enough? Well try and imagine the following: ‘what if man’s homelessness consisted in this’, that ‘he’ was not able to think of homelessness itself as a kind of home, that ‘he’ was not able to dwell within ‘his’ homelessness?
The four quadrants that result are the same edscribed by Heidegger’s infamous fourfold, as I have discussed at length in print. But since Heidegger’s Geviert of earth, sky, gods, and mortals can feel so painfully pseudo-poetic, let’s offer a more respectable quartet of names: space, time, essence, and eidos. All four of these dimensions belong together, since all arise from the tension between unified objects and their tangible qualities.
Ideology by contrast tends to discourage questioning of the facts so as to promote belief or faith in its system of ideas, and is correspondingly reluctant to engage in dialogue that might put into question the origin of those ideas. The neo-Marxist scholarship on the politics of the Kyoto School thinkers and their relation to Heidegger is a perfect example of this latter syndrome.
To understand Heidegger's critique of aesthetics, it will help first to sketch his positive view of art's true historical role. Heidegger's own understanding of the work of art is resolutely populist but with revolutionary aspirations. He believes that, at its greatest, art “grounds history” by “allowing truth to spring forth”.
A large portion of Heidegger’s philosophy boils down to this simple opposition between Zu- and Vorhandenheit. His break with Husserl hinges entirely on his rejection of Husserlian phenomena as a form of presence-at-hand. And this harsh treatment goes far beyond Husserl, since Heidegger holds that the entire history of philosophy is guilty of reducing reality to some form of presence.
[F]or Heidegger constituting the self is only possible through the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity. Dasein cannot however install itself in authenticity once and for all. As selftranscendence, Dasein's being is given to him as a task, as each time having to be etc., all these do not allow objectification and a supposed continuity of authenticity: Dasein's being is born each moment from its confrontation with its modalities and possibilities of being.
However, this relatively abstract world of sameness and difference is, in fact, coterminous with the concrete world of Being and time as presented in, e.g., Heidegger's late work Zeit und Sein. We find this passage on the second to last page of that austere and highly condensed essay: "What renmains to be said? Only this: Appropriation appropriates. By this, we say the same of the same toward the same"
Even though Heidegger’s Kehre indeed shifts from Dasein to Ereignis, what does this mean for the transcendental imagination? It might be conceivable that Heidegger was confronted with an immediate problem, namely that of the distinction between the inner and outer. In Kant we notice that time is an inner sense, and insofar as fundamental ontology – beginning with the transcendence of Dasein as a being outside-itself – remains stuck in this opposition, i.e., the opposition of space and time, the problem of transcendence perhaps remains unresolved.
A selection from Heidegger's first to his last works.MORE
Heidegger's use of Stimmung is not to be understood subjectively where the world meaningfully affects me in terms of my own psychological “states of mind,” being depressed, afraid, bored, or excited. Rather, Stimmung is the condition for the possibility of any individual disposition or mood. The mood is not in me, in the body; I am already in a mood by virtue of my public involvements, by being thrown into a shared social context that determines the way things affect me. In short, mood is “like an atmosphere,” already “there” prior to the emergence of the body, and it is by means of this atmosphere that my embodied engagements are tuned or disposed in one way or another toward things.
When one binds oneself to the being that is illuminated, one is free to better understand beings, where understanding ‘first of all lets beings as beings be.’ Therefore, it is one’s freedom that determines how beings will be shown—whether ‘more beingful or less beingful,’ in Heidegger’s words. And freedom is determined by whether the self-binding entails ‘the individual grasping himself as being-there [Da-sein], set back into the isolation and thrownness of his historical past and future. The more primordial the binding, the greater the proximity to beings.’ In other words, freedom is freedom to commit oneself to seeing beings as they actually appear when illuminated, apart from the everyday awareness with which we are ordinarily inclined to see them. It is only with this sort of freedom, which must be accompanied by a keen awareness of our deeply historical situation and thrownness, that we are able to allow beings to be seen as they are.
But as for the manner of leaping and what to leap means, that would perhaps be a question precisely of leaping beyond the Heideggerian sense of leaping . It would thus be a question of transindividuating the potential of philosophical individuation in which the preindividual reserve [fonds] of the Heideggerian text consists, insofar as it expands and supersaturates the question of leaping by pushing the “question of being” or the “question of the history of being” to the extreme.
A key text on Heidegger's way of thinking and ecology.MORE
One of the books in the New Studies in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics series edited by Kenneth Maly, Parvis Emad, and Gail Stenstad.
[I]n Sein und Zeit Heidegger offers no further analysis of his concept of “being-towards- beginning” (Sein zum Anfang), but instead quickly returns to asserting the priority of being-towards-death for the self-understanding of human existence. This priority of death, is precisely what Arendt contested already in her 1929 dissertation on Augustine’s theory of love.
Gods and men are not only lighted by a light--even if a supersensible one--so that they can never hide themselves from it in darkness; they are luminous in their essence. They are alight; they are appropriated into the event of lighting, and therefore never concealed.
Within the framework of the ontological difference, Be-ing is not yet fully thought in its truth apart from beings, for it still retains the ontic-ontological structure belonging to the analytic of Da-sein, and still conceives Being in terms of its relationship with beings as a whole. Heidegger’s fragmentary “confrontation” with Hegel on the origin of negativity—for Heidegger, the essential-presencing of Be-ing as abyssal ground—marks an important transitional stage on the way to the thinking of Ereignis.
I want to focus particularly on the concepts of, ‘The-they,’ ‘authenticity/inauthenticity,’ and ‘fallenness.’ I have chosen these specific terms because they express important themes in existentialist philosophy. I feel that an effective way of illustrating the meaning of these terms is to make reference to the film Holiday.
Including Heidegger translations online, Helene Weiss and Ernst Tugendhat archives, and more.
Oppen does not have to confront or explain experience, or for that matter philosophy, specifically the philosophy of Dasein or Being; instead, he practices poetry in the Heideggerian sense of that act, not unlike the way in which Heidegger practices philosophy, so that what Heidegger calls gelassenheit or releasement takes place
[Heidegger] declared that ethics is impossible and his whole being was permeated by the awareness that this fact opens up an abyss. Prior to Heidegger's émergence the most outstanding German philosopher — I would say the only German philosopher — was Edmund Husserl. It was Heidegger's critique of Husserl's phenomenology which became decisive: precisely because that criticism consisted in a radicalization of Husserl's own question and questioning.
The relentlessly conjoined objectification of entities and subjectification of our accountability to them inevitably transformed that accountability itself into a further object (a “value”) for a subject. Values then need clarification and objective assessment in turn, but their objectification as values to be chosen undermines their authority over the choice.
Despite Heidegger's efforts to avoid any commitment to an ultimate metaphysical reality, Derrida thinks that Heidegger's talk about the presencing of Being and its appropriation involves such a metaphysical metaphor. In fact, it is Heidegger's theory of language that reveals his entrapment. Of Grammatology intends to show that any theory of the sign as consisting of an irreducible dualism between signifier and signified is based on the metaphysical illusion that a sign must be a sign of something and that language needs this referentiality to be capable of expressing truths.
Heidegger does not attempt to do philosophy or nonphilosophy, but
philosophywhich does not deal with being, but with being.
[I]nsofar as [Heidegger] rejects the claim of humanism to have adequately defined the humanity of man, and opposes to it his own onto-anthropology, he nonetheless indirectly retains the most important function of classical humanism - namely, the befriending of man through the word of the other - indeed, he radicalizes this drive to befriend, and transfers it from mere pedagogy to the center of ontological consciousness.
Yet Heidegger makes it patently clear that a phenomenological interpretation of these phenomena comes at the price of cutting off the bond that ties these themes to morality. The liberation of these themes from their moral and ethical interpretations turns out to be a necessary condition for their phenomenological appropriation.
A thorough and comprehensive study of the later Heidegger's works through the motifs of homelessness and homecoming.MORE
One of the books in the New Studies in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics series edited by Kenneth Maly, Parvis Emad, and Gail Stenstad.
I argue that humans are always appropriated, and that since individuals throughout history have experienced what could be described as being owned by being, the possibility of such an experience is not dependent on some unknown future event.
That which Heidegger can offer to Wittgenstein is the possibility of seeing under the aspect of the Nothing, as the question of the historicity of existence, and that such seeing will have its use, and perhaps, will help to clarify certain unresolved questions in Wittgenstein’s work, such as the relation between rule and custom.
The U. S. Department of Energy’s Hanford nuclear reservation serves as an illustrative text, exemplifying Heidegger’s reading of nuclear energy as a culmination of both Western metaphysics and the instrumental stance that he calls “enframing.”
Perhaps contrary to his intentions, as a critic of the technological epoch Heidegger emerges as the quintessential Platonic philosopher ‘of the twentieth century’ — castigating the democratising errors of technological disclosure in the name of a more profound philosophical wisdom: a philosophic-poetic wisdom that would allow us to stand in a freer relation to a technological world that currently dominates us.
Since Plato, [Heidegger] believes, Western philosophy has interposed logical essences between Being and man and has thus forced Being to disclose itself through man-made forms. We must recover the original experience of immediacy which preceded sophisticated thought.
Heidegger suggests the following: Traditional philosophy embraces truth as life’s ultimate guiding principle, for as the logic runs, humans require truth in order to have a meaningful life. Is it not right to demand that life, in the first instance, be grounded and guided by truth in all of its aspects? Nietzsche vehemently opposes such logic.
In Heidegger's view conscience does not primarily accuse me of being guilty of this or that action but it makes me aware of what it means for me to be guilty at all. Conscience is original responsibility - it is a matter of my very existence. Conscience is, in Heidegger's terms, the call of being and it call us to authenticity.
The first articulation, let us say on the whole and for simplicity’s sake, is that of Being and of the entity, one which finds expression in terms of the meta and that tends to be ‘ecstatico-horizonal’ and ontico-ontological, to take up two Heideggerian expressions in a simplified, descriptive sense. It constitutes a historico-systematic structural a priori proper to the philosophies of communication which are develloping globally in the realm of the meta and of the universal project, albeit obviously not without brushing up against the event both in its lower aspect of generality or representation, that of the media for instance, and in its higher aspect, that which Heidegger, for example, upholds as Ereignis.
Heidegger’s elegant description of the bridge reflects my belief in the preeminence of “place” and the role that dialogue should play in the creation of architecture—or, as he says, “this speaking that listens and accepts is responding”. So too must architectural response arise from attitudes and practices that are first trained to speak by listening.
Already in the 1930s, Heidegger emphasized the fundamental "derangement" [Ver-Rueckheit] that the emergence of Man introduces into the order of entities: the event of Clearing is in itself an Ent-Eignen, a radical and thorough distortion, with no possibility of "return to the undistorted Order" - Ereignis is cosubstantial with the distortion/derangement, it is NOTHING BUT its own distortion.
The much discussed Summer Semester 1924 Marburg lectures. Attending are Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hans Jonas, Karl Löwith, Jakob Klein, Leo Strauss, and Helene Weiss, the greatest gathering of German intellectual acumen since Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling roomed together at Tübingen.MORE
If one comes to the authors Hölderlin and Rilke from the background of German culture and scholarship, then they tend to appear quite differently from their guise in contexts where Heidegger discusses them. The window onto Hölderlin’s work opened by Heidegger’s texts is a very narrow one.
Language cannot flourish without mythology just as pathogens cannot thrive without a host, or as plants cannot grow without soil. Here again language is an outgrowth of something else. For Heidegger, language grows out of koto and for Tolkien it grows out of mythology, but the basic concept about the nature of language is the same.
Time is accordingly the three-dimensional "reaching" (Reichen) of the three ecstasies of time, past, present and future. This reaching, which Heidegger also characterizes as a "giving" (Geben) is, in turn, given by propriation. Hence, time proper is a giving given by the giving of propriation, that is, the giving of a giving (Geben eines Gebens). Likewise, being itself is given by propriation as the giving of presence that in turn enables the presence of what is given, namely, beings, in their epochal castings.[Now with MP3 audio file.]
We must pose Heidegger the questions: What has happened to power in his casting of the fourfold (Geviert)? What is the relationship between power and letting-be (Gelassenheit)? Reposing the question concerning power necessarily brings the questions concerning the ontology of movement and time into (re)play.
a review of Charles Bambach's Heidegger's Roots
It would seem that, in this appropriation of the past, Bambach's sincere attempt to disclose the historical/political context of 1933-45 has perhaps overly determined his own reading of Heidegger . If an interpretation of the past takes place by the present, then the present must remain open-in Heidegger's understanding of that term-to freeing the philosopheme from its historiographical articulation.
poetically man dwalls
leavin no juist mairks buit meanins
Heidegger eventually articulates the “it” of the es gibt as Ereignis. This event of appropriation does not designate a kind of horizon akin to the ontological horizon of the early Heidegger. Nor does it refer to the manifestation of being through Dasein’s disclosure of its own possibilities. Rather, Ereignis designates a groundon the other side of the appearance and its horizon, a ground that cannot be properly attributed to Dasein because it itself remains concealed in the process of manifestation.
Heidegger's warning that a technical approach to thinking about the world obscures its true essence is directly applicable to the effects of current (as well as former) information technologies that provide access to law. While technology enhances accessibility and utility of law, technology also obscures law's fundamental grounding in experience and language, thereby eviscerating its transformative power.
The uncertainty emerges because that which is offering us an opportunity remains hidden. Despite its immediate nearness, it is not the present; what has become the present is no longer opportunity. Therefore Heidegger can quite literally say of the 'nearer-bringing nearness' that it 'keeps open the arriving from the future by withholding the present in the coming'.
The ecstatic structure of stimmung is the "reciprocal relation" between mortals and divinities. Seeing the divinities as the mood of encounter allows a clearer understanding of the nature of this reciprocation, in that the divinities announce themselves as a pervasive atmosphere that lights up one’s engagement with a specific situation
I am questioning anti-technological humanism as well as digital metaphysics. I believe that we live in an age in which the sense of Being is widely interpreted from a digital perspective as the ‘Zeitgeist’ of post-industrial societies. From this perspective I also question what one could call a digital humanism that would look for the limits of the digital within the realm of the human.
Friday, April 17th and Saturday, April 18th, 2009
The University of Dallas, Irving, Texas
Heidegger's model of dialogue is a monologue of Being's own saying with itself, the appropriating or enowning event (Ereignis) to itself, or of the Greek origin with itself. This saying only occurs in Western languages and particularly in Greek and German. The linguistic ethnocentrism of the mid- and later Heidegger cannot be bracketed and his approach to Being and language retained.
[M]uch has been made of Ereignis as the “appropriative event” that opens up a world horizon, but without Austrag—the carrying out of this opening up by the things that bear it—there is no Ereignis.
Heidegger’s specifi c emphasis on the concreteness of the selfrelation is a reason to be cautious about applying a functional perspective to his concept of self-awareness. Such an application would without doubt for him represent a suspicious attempt to objectify the living self that only is and only can be conceived in concrete situations.
now in paperback
The hellish moonscape haunting the ideal tone of the sons of the earth in Hölderlin’s poetry has clearly suffered a psychical subtraction. The disruptive dissonance in Heidegger’s text arises from the desire to repress the absence of a new demigod and force an untroubled ideal. But how are we to understand this oppressive omission? What is the source of Heidegger’s semi-divine wind romance?
[T]he idea of a topology can be understood as a mode of analysis that looks to the articulation of complex structure composed of multiple elements that are simultaneously present as part of a single 'surface', whose unity is not to be understood in terms of anything that underlies it, but in terms of the mutual inter-relation of those elements in their dynamic interaction. It is thus that the Ereignis of Heidegger’s later thinking must be understood as both temporal and spatial – it is the unfolding of place in place – and within the structure of the Ereignis there is no derivation of elements, but rather a gathering of those elements in their originary belonging together.
It is within this intersection of truth, history, and preservers that Heidegger hints at an idea that I find gripping: that the work of art is also that of subjectivity formation. “Preserving the work means: standing within the openness of being that happens in the work.” “Openness of being” is a phrase that Heidegger uses often in conjunction with truth, and therefore associates the subject position of preservers as “standing within” the truth that happens in a work of art. I take “standing within” to be a powerful assimilation of the viewer (preserver) with the truth of a work of art – it is a stronger claim of interaction than merely “standing before” a work of art.
[T]his gives the known classes that Martin Heidegger took from these different teachers. Some of their publications and web sites where you can find more details.
It is not simply that Heidegger might claim that only our experience is our experience, and that the answer to these can only ever be assertions about our experience and not the experience itself. More profoundly, the background must always be that which stays in the background, as it is the condition of possibility for allowing experience to show up in the foreground of our awareness.
Heidegger's recognition that the 'nihilating' of the nothing is the action of being as such, an activity which exceeds and so cannot be explained in terms of the ontological difference between being and entities, is the defining experience at the heart of his so-called 'turn' and the sine qua non of his 'later' thought.
In Heidegger’s view, Aristotle failed to recognize the ontological difference and — partly as a consequence of this — he failed to recognize the unique nature of Dasein, the being who has an understanding of being. The result of the Aristotelian ontology was an ontology of things that are simply there, or present-to-hand. Aristotelian substance ontology ushered in the “metaphysics of presence” that Heidegger sought to move beyond.
Ereignis is the happening of being, the unfolding of being, the temporalizing of being, the turning of thought. As such Ereignis is prior to and transcends both being and time. Ereignis captures the “and” of “being and time”.
For Heidegger, what is endangered is the aletheic, poetic essence of truth, the veiled essence of truth, an insight he has from Nietzsche, where he can say almost as Nietzsche would: "Truth is un-truth" and mean, with reference to poiesis, to poetry, and the poet already named, "Truth as the clearing and concealing of what is, happens in being composed, as a poet composes a poem."
Being and Time is not just, as we usually presume, a book concerned with a critique of Descartes, Kant and Hegel, but a book that is positively charged by an engagement with Aristotle.
Heidegger's way of portraying the whole history of the West as a single "propriative event," or Ereignis, has seemed to some critics to be unncessarily confining. If we are to grasp the basis of Heidegger's quest for a new openness, and what such openness might entail, we must take care to understand the finitude he associated with human belongingness to a particular history.
Heidegger criticised the interpretation of theoretic conceptualisation as the only way toward knowledge by highlighting that primary knowledge of the individual is not conceptual at all and that it is not possible to make everything the individual knows completely explicit.
Grounding the confrontation in the film between the languages of Greek and German is the encounter between the interrogator and the interrogated, between a member of the de-Nazification committee and Heidegger, between worldly politics and originary politics. This mock interchange is brilliantly conceived and enacted by Hong to reveal the abysmal disconnection between the worldly politics of Western Europe and Heidegger’s ontology.
For heidegger “the child at play is the Seinsgeschick”, the fateful sending of being”. This notion, related to the Ereignis that is the propriating event of being, is what gives space and time. Paralleling angelus silesius’s line about the rose, heidegger suggests that the child of the ‘play of the world’ “plays, because it plays”. heidegger’s claim is that “the ‘because’ is subsumed [versinkt] in the game. the game is without ‘why’”. For heidegger, the “play of the world” is thus the “sending [Geschick] of being”.
[O]ne can experience the other in a theological transcendence and realise the Difference of that other so as to be able to articulate a different idea of the other’s identity using language and ideas of the same. Thus, one can describe someone differently based on the ideas grasped about them at the event of appropriation, while realising that the other’s entirety is beyond words.
Heidegger suggests an ontological form of nihilism in his story about the forgetting (or oblivion) of Being in the history of metaphysics. Vattimo argues that we should embrace nihilism positively in both these senses: it means that there is very little of Being left in the metaphysical sense; that is, considered as an objective and eternal structure.