The Affaire Sheehan / Birmingham: Fritsche’s Rülpsen on Heidegger’s Being and Time

Johannes Fritsche
Boğaziçi University, İstanbul, Turkey
johannes.fritsche@boun.edu.tr

October 05, 2016 (16,953 + 4,813 = 21,766 words)

Abstract: In a paper, “L’affaire Faye: Faut-il brûler Heidegger? A Reply to Fritsche, Pégny, and Rastier,” published in Philosophy Today 60(2) (2016), Thomas Sheehan claims that in my book, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1999), I mistranslate every key term in §74 of Being and Time and get everything wrong regarding this section. In this paper, I show that Sheehan’s critique is unfounded. Relying on an interpretation of §74 that is as banal as it is philologically and hermeneutically wholly arbitrary and false it is rather he himself who has got wrong all the points that he adduces. I also present some of Sheehan’s numerous fraudulent allegations and manipulations. Philosophy Today refused to publish my response (see the postscript). To whom it may concern: please, note Shannee Marks’s project of a documentary on Reiner Schüermann that I mention, along with her e-mail address, at the end of my paper.

Key words: Being and Time, Birmingham, Faye, Fritsche, Heidegger, historicity, Rülpsen, Sheehan

After Faye’s book, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935 (2009; French original 2005), my book on Heidegger, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time (Fritsche 1999), has come under the scrutiny of Thomas Sheehan because it “has profoundly influenced Emmanuel Faye and other members of Faye et Cie.,” and is “one of the foundational pillars holding up the canard that is Faye’s” (Sheehan 2016: 486) book (canard, canard [French]: duck, cock-and-bull-story, newspaper hoax, canard, local rag, J.F.). The result is as alarming as is his paper on Faye’s book (Sheehan 2015). The tone is equally impudent, and one has to seriously worry about his state of mind. For instance, right at the beginning he suggests that I say that Heidegger wrote the theory of history in §74 of Sein und Zeit because he had read it in volume 2 of Hitler’s Mein Kampf and then claims to refute me by pointing out that this volume was published “on 10 December 1926, a week after Heidegger had sent off his manuscript of SZ to the printers” (Sheehan 2016: 485). The result is also kind of funny: my book—a philosophical “Rülpsen” (Sheehan 2016: 503 n. 61). A Rülpsen (a German word) is that particular noise

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1 I have referenced every quote in a quote according to my own way of referencing quotes. In all quotes, three dots in brackets (“[…]”) indicate my omissions, italics and three dots without brackets are with the respective authors, and English words in square brackets (e.g., “[in order to press]”) are my abbreviations of the quote or (e.g., “[the Überlieferung]”) my replacements of “he / she / it.” I did not indicate when I (and not the respective translator) inserted the German wording into the English translation. For the bibliography, see p. 34.

2 As proof of his claim Sheehan quotes me: “Heidegger’s concept of historicity is identical to Hitler’s.” (Sheehan 2016: 485) My whole sentence reads: “[O]ne sees easily that Heidegger’s concept of historicity is identical to Hitler’s and Scheler’s ideas of history and, thus, politically on the Right.” (Fritsche 1999: 126) I say this in a summary, right before I discuss the strong theoretical differences between Scheler and Hitler (see also Fritsche 2016a) (which enabled Scheler in the 1920s, in sharp contrast to Heidegger, to recognize in Hitler the real foe and turn from the right to the center [Fritsche 1999: 142-48]). Most rightists wanted to destroy, or delimit, society and repeat or re-realize the community that had been destroyed, or marginalized, by the emergence
people produce, normally involuntarily, when they have eaten too much and the air in the overwhelmed stomach forces its way out upward and out of the mouth, i.e., a belch, a very powerful burp. Many would probably be happy to produce books that way as, for instance, I am sure one finds this idea somewhere in one of the novels of the German romantic writer of the Goethe era, Johannes Paul Friedrich Richter, alias (pen name or Deckname) Jean Paul. Sheehan’s piece is not a Rülpsen. Rather, to make me look as stupid and hallucinatory (Fritsche’s “Magic Theatre (‘For Madmen Only. Price of Admission Your Mind’)” [Sheehan 2016: 504]) as possible it is well done—well, all too well. Independent of its numerous absurd allegations and manipulations, with its tone, its display of seemingly vast knowledge, its know-all judgments about each and anyone and -anything, its childish pride, its supposedly acidic formulations and innuendos, its getting personal, its frequent repetitions, its obsession with unimportant issues, its complete lack of any discursivity, and its machine-gun (“Wrong! Wrong! Wrong!”) lists of alleged errors and other supposed oddities in my book (Fritsche 1999) and my response to his paper on Faye (Fritsche 2016) that altogether unavoidably evoke sad and unpleasant images of its author, readers will wonder how the referees and editors at University of California Press allowed Fritsche to ramble on and on for 371 pages.

of society. The question was which community should be repeated (the Vikings, the first emperor’s reign, Prussia, etc.). Scheler recognized already before World War I that for the promoters of the Volksgemeinschaft (the community of the people) the individual counts for nothing in and of itself. That’s why, in his view, the Volksgemeinschaft was the lowest of the large-scale communities and should enter politics only in the service of the higher ones. He himself argued for the repetition of the world-wide Catholic love-community in which the respect for each individual as a value in and of itself and the solidarity for all are combined (see Fritsche 1999: 97-100, 136-40; Fritsche 2016: 431; Fritsche 2016a: 587-88, 590-91). As a matter of fact, in Sein und Zeit Heidegger uses the core of an ethics in which, just as in Hitler, the individual is essentially for others (and the Volk) (see Fritsche 2016c). By the way, Hitler made all the main points already in the first volume of Mein Kampf from 1925. Thus, there was enough time for Heidegger to recognize that with his vote for the Volksgemeinschaft (community of the people) as the Gemeinschaft to be repeated (see my sections 2-5) he was in agreement with Hitler.

3 Since I had experienced that many Americans were misguided about Heidegger because they had no knowledge of German and the culture in Germany at that time, I relatively often explained the usages of German words and the associations coming to the mind of native speakers and sometimes made jokes (see Fritsche 1999: XIV) and polemical comments, especially in the 124 pages of endnotes, which “often run from four to nine pages each in small print” (Sheehan 2016: 484) (see Fritsche 1999: 229-352). Treating these passages as though they came out of a regular scholarly book, it is, of course, easy to find phrases that, taken out of context, sound outlandish. Sheehan adds my endnotes almost as often as the main text, and says that one “reason for reading the notes is that you might find them entertaining—if, that is, your taste in humor runs to (reader discretion advised) the German slang for having a hard-on, a woody, or a drooper (Fritsche 1999: 310.30-311.36 [endn. 10]) or for defeating and urinating in your pants (Fritsche 1999: 192.13)” (Sheehan 2016: 484).

As to the first of these two passages, in a contribution to the research, initiated by Derrida and in the 1990s fashionable, on Geschlecht (sex, sex organ, generation [as in “generation of the baby boomers”], etc.) in Heidegger (Fritsche 1999: 188-194), I quote an occurrence of a German expression for an erected penis in Heidegger, which the English translator, deliberately or not, has made unrecognizable but which Heidegger employs in a talk about the task of the university in the National Socialist state in November 1933 in Tübingen (according to the only source, at any rate, the version of the talk printed in a local newspaper [see Heidegger 2000a: 823]) in the context of speaking about himself and his co-fighters in the fight for the realization of National Socialism as “merely a transition, merely a sacrifice”: “we must have” this bodily organ in that peculiar state in which it “no longer clings to / hangs on anything of its own but commits itself to / fixes itself on the rationale of the existence / the foundation of the people” (Fritsche 1999: 189.19-21, translation changed, J. F., 307.44f. [endn. 1]; Heidegger 2000a: 772.27f.), a sentence that requires some comments on Heidegger’s rhetoric and the sociological aspects of some expressions. In addition, I point out that Heidegger’s wording as it appeared in the newspaper was perhaps a courageous act of subversion of the pompous language of Heidegger and the National Socialists on the part of a typesetter of that newspaper (Fritsche 1999: 307.41-309.18 [endn. 1], 310.26-312.18 [endn. 10]). (cont. of the note on the next page)
Sheehan does not even mention that, in sharp contrast to his own dogmatic and authoritarian procedure, I develop—(since he names texts of mine on Aristotle [Sheehan 2016: 483, 532, 534; see also 490f.]) in the “good old way” of the Aristotle commentators in late antiquity and the middle ages: first the other interpretations, only thereafter one’s own—my interpretations out of discussions of other readings and that I present the theories of history and politics in Adolf Hitler (Fritsche 1999: 68-87), the early Max Scheler (Fritsche 1999: 87-124), the late Max Scheler (Fritsche 1999: 142-48), Georg Lukács (Fritsche 1999: 149-173), and Paul Tillich (Fritsche 1999: 173-187) and compare Heidegger with them.

The second passage definitely contains no humor at all. Commenting on the rather old-fashioned German word Gemächte (something someone has gemacht [produced], male sex organ, etc.) that Heidegger uses in his theory of production and technology I give as my fourth example of the usage of the somewhat colloquial everyday verb machen a phrase that probably all parents use: “Or, babies or children ‘machen Pipi.’ or ‘machen sich in die Hose,’ that is, urinate or defecate into their pants.” (Fritsche 1999: 192)

Sheehan quotes me: “‘has not understood anything’” (Fritsche 1999: 333.26-27 [endn. 72])” (Sheehan 2016: 503 n. 62). In the preceding sentence, I say that I imitate here the style of David Krell, whom I quote in that context (Fritsche 1999: 333f. [endn. 72]). Only “‘those who are unable to read and listen’ (Fritsche 1999: 340.37 [endn. 6])” (Sheehan 2016: 503) will doubt my interpretation, as Sheehan suggests I say. My text has “able” and not “unable,” and he obviously hasn’t understood the whole note (which he adduces eight times [Sheehan 2016: 499 n. 41, 499 n. 42, 500 n. 44, 500 n. 46, 502 n. 53, 503 n. 60, 518, 518]) anyway (see Sheehan 2016: 499f.), as he turns upside down Fritsche 1999: 286-88 (endn. 62) (see Sheehan 2016: 502f.).

In a decisive sentence in §74 (see the beginning of my Section 4), Heidegger determines Geschick (destiny) as the “Geschichten der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes” (BT 384.32). Both Stambaugh and Macquarrie and Robinson mistranslate the phrase by rendering the second definite article (“des”) as an indefinite one (“occurrence of the community, of a people” [BTS: 352.5]; “the historizing of the community, of a people” [BTM: 436.18]); Macquarrie and Robinson mistranslate the words that precede this quote [see Fritsche 1999: 268f. {endn. 3}]. When I quote in my book from 1999 the English translation of Heidegger’s determination of Geschick for the first time, I emphasize the indefinite article (“‘the community, of a {sic} people’” [Fritsche 1999: 131], add a long note in which I point out the mistranslation in both Stambaugh and Macquarrie and Robinson, explain with reference to an elaboration on the difference between both kinds of articles by Rosenzweig the significance of Heidegger’s original wording (while the definite article with Volk is used by rightists to exclude anything and anyone “non-German” from the German Volk as Heidegger does in Sein und Zeit [see my Sections 2-5; see also Fritsche 2016c]), the indefinite article transforms Heidegger into a multiculturalist à la Herder), and say that, from now on, I will quote the English translation in a modified form indicating through curly brackets my change (“of the community, of the people”) (Fritsche 1999: 238f. [endn. 17]). Whatever one thinks of my comments, no one can deny that Heidegger’s text has the definite article in front of “Volkes” and that in replacing “a” with “[the],” I don’t change the wording of Sein und Zeit but rather to the contrary—with two pet words of Sheehan’s (see my Section 1)—“free up” or “retrieve” this original wording from under its mistranslation in both English translations. In my first paper on Sheehan, I point out that, in his paper on Faye, it is not, as Sheehan claims, Faye but rather he himself who misquotes Heidegger’s definition of Geschick (Fritsche 2016: 430-31; see Sheehan 2015: 379, with n. 40). Nonetheless, in Sheehan 2016 he writes without mentioning my first quote of the English translation of Heidegger’s phrase and my long note and without any further comment but with hyperventilating italics: “Note how Fritsche changes the wording of SZ 384.32 at Fritsche 2016: 433 n. 4 and in Fritsche 1999: 132.39-40, 140.12-16; 217.41-218.2; and 218.24-26.” (Sheehan 2016: 517; see also his insertion “[note the comma]’” as though I had smuggled in the comma between “Gemeinschaft” and “des Volkes” at 499 n. 39 where he, in addition, misunderstands a sentence of mine in Fritsche 2016: 431), obviously to make readers forget that I had pointed out that it was not Faye but rather he who had misquoted Heidegger’s phrase.

For my attitude toward US-Americans (Sheehan 2016: 519), see Fritsche 1999: 334 (endn. 72), Fritsche 2014: 299 (see also my footnote 23). Hopefully, every instructor would “have a problem” (Sheehan 2016: 519) with the student of Charles Scott and John Sallis whom I mention (see Fritsche 2012: 282 [endn. 146])—except perhaps Sheehan. For, as will become clear, he has even less respect for the words of a text than this student. When Sheehan realizes that his prejudice about a word in Heidegger doesn’t fit what he reads in his dictionaries, he just simply declares that Heidegger uses the word in a special way. In the course of the paper, I will adduce some more of Sheehan’s abundant false allegations. For someone who enjoyed my endnotes along with the book, see Bambach 2001.
After a general introduction and an overview of my interpretation of §74 (Sheehan 2016: 483-486), Sheehan claims, as he announces in five headings, that “Fritsche Mistranslates” (Sheehan 2016: 481, 486, 487, 489, 490) every key term in §74 (Sheehan 2016: 486-492) and “Misinterprets the Whole of §74” (Sheehan 2016: 481, 492-504, 525-31; Fritsche “literally gets nothing right” [Sheehan 2016: 492] in his “utterly bizarre” [Sheehan 2016: 484] interpretation). Later, Sheehan adds a “Coda: On Fritsche’s Mistranslation of Bodenlosigkeit” (Sheehan 2016: 507-508) and three pages of “Notes” (Sheehan 2016: 517-519) on me. I discuss the issues of (1.) the mistranslation of the terms (p. 4) and of (2.) the misinterpretation of §74 regarding these terms, the temporal trajectory, and the main actor in that section (p. 10), lay out (3.) the problem of Gemeinschaft (community) in Being and Time (p. 14), discuss (4.) Sheehan’s reading of Geschick (destiny) in §74 (p. 17), present (5.) my own interpretation of this notion (p. 23), comment on (6.) his “Coda” (p. 26), and (7.) summarize my first paper on Sheehan (Fritsche 2016) and the current one (p. 29). (In a postscript [p. 33], I inform readers about the history of the refusal of Philosophy Today to publish my paper; for the bibliography, see p. 34.) As I shall show, relying on an interpretation of §74 that is as banal as it is philosophically and hermeneutically wholly arbitrary and false, none of his points is valid. Hence, his critique of my book lacks any foundation.

1. The English Translations of the Key Terms in §74 of Sein und Zeit

Sheehan should have said, more precisely, that Fritsche adopts the mistranslations of Macquarrie’s and Robinson’s English translation, the only one available for most of the time I worked on the book. For, after presenting a list of twelve terms (“Zeit is not ‘time,’ Sein is not ‘being,’ […] wiedeholen is not ‘to repeat,’ das Gewesene is not ‘what has been’” [Sheehan 2016: 486f.]) he continues:

Yes, the current English translations (Macquarrie-Robinson and Stambaugh-Schmidt) do render those German terms as above, but in so doing they have misled scholars for over fifty years. (Sheehan 2016: 487)

Sheehan explicates his opinion on three terms of his list.

Macquarrie and Robinson as well as Stambaugh render überliefern and Überlieferung as “to hand down” and “handing down” or “tradition,” and rightly so. In everyday language, Überlieferung is most of the time used in the sense of Tradition (tradition). Any tradition or Überlieferung tradiert, überlieferter (transmits, hands down) something from one generation to the next, and there is probably in English no alternative to “handing down” and “tradition.” According to Sheehan, however, this translation “betrays their philosophical meaning. Überliefern in §74 and elsewhere in Heidegger’s work does not mean ‘to hand down’ but ‘to free up, to liberate’” (Sheehan 2016: 487; see Sheehan 2015a: 181-182). He adduces two quotes from two texts of Heidegger’s from 1955. In the first, Heidegger says in the lecture course on the principle of reason in Sheehan’s rendering:

“… because Überlieferung is a freeing-up in the sense of liberare, to set something free. As such a freeing-up, Überlieferung brings to light the hidden treasure of das
Gewesen…” (Sheehan 2016: 488; das Gewesen(e): pace Sheehan, that which was / has been, i.e., something in the past or coming from the past; see below in this section, J. F.)

Sheehan claims that, in §74, when using the vocabulary of Überlieferung Heidegger does not mean a tradition but rather exclusively Dasein inasmuch as Dasein überliefert, chooses, or “frees up” (Sheehan 2016: 529 and often) a possibility “that it will endeavor to live out authentically in the light of its radical mortality,” a possibility that it takes from a tradition, from “its ‘inherited legacy’ (Erbe)” (Sheehan 2016: 496; see 492-97, 525-31; see Sheehan 2015a: 178-82). Whatever the phrase “and elsewhere” is supposed to cover, it is clear that Sheehan assumes that there are in Heidegger usages of Überlieferung or überliefern where the word means “to liberate” without meaning “to hand down.”

To be sure, Sheehan’s quote looks as though Heidegger would say that Überlieferung in his sense has only one meaning, namely “to set something free,” to the effect that, when one applies this meaning to §74, one might get the idea that not any tradition but exclusively Dasein überliefert and that Dasein überliefert, frees up, something, a possibility, that it has found in a tradition. However, this impression is created through three mishandlings of the quote.

1) In the year of 1955, Heidegger had been for more than twenty years engaged in his history of Being, in which the issue of tradition is indeed important inasmuch as, with the beginning of a new epoch, a body of literature and many concepts are transmitted from the old epoch into the new one. Sheehan probably does not want to say that Heidegger in that year at the beginning of the last session of a lecture course dedicated to an important topic in the history of Being all of a sudden returns to a theme that was important to him within the framework of Sein und Zeit and of his engagement with National Socialism. As a matter of fact, the context of the quote shows without any doubt that Heidegger is talking here about tradition and that, in addition, he distinguishes between two meanings, or modes, of tradition. Speaking about Übersetzung (translation), he says that the translation of a Grundwort (basic / foundational word) from one historical language into another such language, as for instance of the Latin word ratio (“nihil est sine ratio”) into the German word Grund (“nothing is without Grund”) at the beginning of modernity, becomes an Überlieferung to continue:

If [the Überlieferung] rigidifies, a legacy [Überlieferung] can degenerate into a burden and a handicap. It can become this because a legacy [Überlieferung] is genuinely, as its name says, [eigentlich, was ihr Name sagt.] a delivering [Liefern] in the sense of liberare, of liberating. As a liberating, a legacy raises concealed riches of what-has-been [des Gewesenen] into the light of the day even if this light is at first only that of a hesitant dawn. That Grund is [sei] the translation of ratio means to say that ratio has passed over into Grund [Die ratio hat sich in den Grund überliefert], a legacy [Überlieferung] which already early on speaks with a double sense. (Heidegger 1991: 102 = Heidegger 1997: 153; “sei” might better be translated as “shall be”; literally translated, the subordinated clause reads: “ratio has delivered itself / handed down itself / transmitted itself into / as the Grund)
The abstract noun Überlieferung can be used in two ways, for the thing handed down or handing itself down (say, fairy tales or, in this case, the body of Roman and Medieval Latin literature) or for the activities of the individuals through which they hand down that thing (the telling of fairy tales or, in this case, the translating of the translators). In the last sentence, Heidegger definitely means the former, since it is *ratio* in the Latin literature and not the translating of the translators that transmits itself into the *Grund*. Therefore, he will mean in the entire passage the tradition and not the translators. However, even if he mainly or exclusively means the translating, he will certainly not say that they made a resolute decision in the sense of *Sein und Zeit* but rather that they understood their work as the handing down of a body of literature from one language into another one and from the past and present into the future. Thus, he is talking here about a tradition and how it is transmitted or transmits itself (via the translators) and not about freeing up possibilities in Sheehan’s sense.

In addition, he is talking about two meanings, or modes, of tradition and not just one, for he distinguishes between a mode in which the Überlieferung rigidifies and a mode in which it liberates. Therefore, to liberate is by no means the one and only meaning of Überlieferung but only (part of) the meaning of one of its two modes. What, then, is the meaning of Überlieferung for Heidegger? Most certainly, as for everyone else, “to hand down / transmit / deliver something for / to someone,” “to move something from somewhere to somewhere else for / to someone” as, in the case of the Latin literature, from Latin into German and from the readers in the Middle Ages to / for those in the future. Thus, an Überlieferung both as a tradition that transmits itself and as the activity of the transmitters of that tradition hands down something, and without doing so it can neither liberate nor rigidify something.

2) In his quote itself, Sheehan has left out the phrase, “genuinely, as its name says,” which has the effect that readers are prevented from getting the idea that Heidegger might talk in the quote itself and its context of several meanings or modes of Überlieferung.

3) In contrast to Lilly (“a delivering”), Sheehan falsely translates liefern, namely as “freeing-up.” Heidegger certainly does not say that liefern means nothing but freeing-up, liberation. Rather, he will, as anyone else, say that liefern means “to deliver something” or “to hand over something to someone,” as any tradition or any Lieferung of a piece of furniture or a pizza that one had ordered liefert (delivers) something to someone. Liefern is just another everyday name for übergeben, aushändigen, überliefern (to deliver, to hand over, to hand down, etc.) and as such means an act of moving something from somewhere to somewhere else. In addition, in Heidegger’s opinion it can happen in the case of traditions that the Lieferung is a liberation. Furthermore, he believes that some medieval Latin usages of liberare and their German translations as liefern entitle one to say that the genuine meaning of the German word liefern is, or was, “to liberate” (as one can see already in the pertinent dictionaries, without being in need to read the texts they refer to, in the sense of “to punctually hand over to A something that one owes A,” wages to one’s employees, interest to one’s creditor, taxes to the church or the landowner, etc.; i.e., in a meaning that has nothing to do with Sheehan’s Dasein freeing up a possibility). In brief, he distinguishes between several meanings or modes of liefern and privileges one of them, but each of these meanings is, or implies, an act of handing over or down.

Sheehan’s third mishandling has the same effect as the second and the first one, namely to prevent readers from realizing that not only in the context of the quote, but even in
the quote itself Heidegger talks about several modes of Überlieferung. Since all three mishandlings are necessary and sufficient for keeping readers in the belief that Heidegger is talking about only one meaning, it seems unlikely that Sheehan mishandled the quote inadvertently. Thus, as in the case of his silly allegation that I maintain that Heidegger copied Hitler’s Mein Kampf and as in numerous other cases, most certainly readers will have to live with the shocking truth that the professor at the Department for Religious Studies at Stanford University and, by courtesy, professor at the Department of Philosophy at the same institution, Thomas Sheehan, deliberately violates the basic protocol of any academic work and deliberately cheats or, as he charges Faye with (Sheehan 2015), commits frauds. To be sure, Heidegger does use one meaning of Überlieferung, but this meaning is not, as Sheehan has it, “freeing up” but rather, as any other native German speaker understands the word, “handing down, transmitting, delivering.” In addition, he does not use just one meaning of Überlieferung but rather develops two meanings or modes, namely a handing down that rigidifies and one that liberates. Furthermore, the general meaning that he employs is used by common parlance as well as by him for traditions and not, as Sheehan has it, exclusively for Dasein’s resolute decision in the sense of his understanding of Sein und Zeit. In sum, Sheehan turns the meaning as well as the reference of Überlieferung upside down. Sheehan’s second quote and its context show the same. Thus, his examples don’t bear out his claim that Überlieferung in Heidegger means more or less often “to free up” without meaning “to hand down” (Sheehan 2016: 487).

In addition, in 1955 Heidegger explains the second mode, obviously because he is aware that readers won’t be that familiar with Überlieferung as liberare, and this is what he normally does when he uses an established word in an unusual meaning. Now, outside of the chapter on historicity Heidegger employs überliefern and Überlieferung in Sein und Zeit exclusively in the usual meaning of “handing down” or “tradition.” To give a few examples, the word occurs for the first time in §2: “Furthermore, the average, vague understanding of being can be permeated by traditional [überlieferten] theories and opinions about being […]” (BTS: 4 = SZ: 6). The noun follows just a few pages later: “In the historical and humanistic disciplines the drive toward historical actuality itself has been strengthened by the transmission and portrayal of tradition.” (BTS: 8 = SZ: 10; or, “by the tradition / transmission and its presentation and tradition [durch Überlieferung und deren Darstellung und Tradition]” (BTS: 8 = SZ: 10). Probably, “Überlieferung” covers here things, such as the oral transmission of, say, fairy tales, “deren Darstellung” the collecting (and publishing) of these fairy tales by the Grimm brothers, and “Tradition” the later reprints of the collection, but “Überlieferung” might also mean the collecting itself. In the latter case, Überlieferung might have an aspect of Sheehan’s “freeing up” inasmuch as the collecting hands down / over the fairy tales to the public and thus brings to the attention of people something that they have ignored up to that point. However, it is clear that even in that case the word is self-evidently used with regard to processes or activities of handing down something to someone and not with regard to choices in Sheehan’s sense and that the fairy tales could not be “freed up” for the public, or the Grimm brothers could not “free them up” for the public (or themselves), without that the fairy tales were handed down to the public (or to the Grimm brothers).

Heidegger has treated the problem of Überlieferung already in Sein und Zeit, in the famous §6, “The Task of a Destruction [Destruktion] of the History of Ontology” (BTM: 17 =
The tradition [Tradition] that hereby gains dominance makes what it “transmits” [“übergibt”] so little accessible that initially and for the most part it covers it over instead. What has been handed down [das Überkommene] it hands over to obviousness; it bars access to those original “wellsprings” out of which the traditional [überlieferen] categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. The tradition even makes us forget such a provenance altogether. (BTS: 19 = SZ: 21)

Überliefert is here self-evidently used in the sense of “handed down from one generation to the next.” In addition, Heidegger uses the word for a case that is the opposite of the one for which Sheehan reserves the word, for Heidegger uses it here for a rigidifying Überlieferung, one in which the tradition does not liberate but rather produces “concealments” (BTS: 20 = SZ: 22). Thus the task of

the destruction [Destruktion] of the traditional [überlieferen] content of ancient ontology which is to be carried out along the guidelines of the question of being. This destruction is based upon the original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding determinations of being were gained. (BTS: 20 = SZ: 22; see BTS: 23 = SZ: 26; replacement of “destructuring” with “destruction” is mine, J. F.)

This quote, too, shows that Heidegger uses already in Sein und Zeit Überlieferung / überliefern in the same way as in Sheehan’s quote from 1955. The meaning of überliefern is not, as Sheehan has it, a liberation without any handing down but rather a handing down, and in the case of traditions this handing down can take two forms, a rigidifying and a liberating one. In the chapter on historicity itself Heidegger at no point indicates, in contrast to the quote from 1955, that he would employ these words in an unusual way. Thus, it is unavoidable also in Being and Time to translate them as “hanging down”—and probable, if not unavoidable, to assume that Überlieferung is also in §74 in the first place a matter of the tradition and not of Dasein choosing a possibility from the tradition.

How does Heidegger use das Gewesen(e)? The word is the noun to the perfect participle (gewesen) of the verb sein, “to be,” and thus refers to something in the past, as it clearly does in the above Heidegger quote from 1955 and in everyday language (“Yesterday, the weather was / has been [war / ist gewesen] beautiful,” “I’ll keep in mind everything that was / has been yesterday [alles, was gestern gewesen ist],” “Everything that was / has been yesterday [Alles gestern Gewesen] will never be forgotten.”). Hence, Macquarrie and Robinson as well as Stambaugh render gewesen, and related words, with phrases containing “having-been” or “been” indicating the past, and there seems to be no viable alternative. According to Sheehan, however, in doing so they mistranslate these words. In the last eight lines of a short paragraph of 14 lines in, as Sheehan himself points out, the “pivotal” (Sheehan 2016: 491) §65 of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger three times uses gewesen and twice Gewesen, and determines Gewesen as Dasein’s “eigenstes ‘wie es je schon war’” (SZ: 325f. = Dasein’s “ownmost ‘how it always already was,’ that is, its ‘having-been’ [‘Gewesen’]” (BTS: 299 = “its ownmost ‘as-it-
All-knowing Sheehan is sure that it never occurred to me, after all an “expert in Aristotle” (Sheehan 2016: 490), that Heidegger’s determination of Gewesen is a reference to Aristotle’s notion of τὸ τί ἦν αἰών (Sheehan 2016: 490f.; “the: what-was-to-be?” [according to Sheehan, this literal translation is, of course, a false translation (Sheehan 2015a: 171)], e.g., “the: what was it for a human being to be a human being?”). However, especially if this is the case, Sheehan’s claim is as incomprehensible as the one concerning Überlieferung. Already at the end of the very paragraph itself, Heidegger employs the abstract noun Gewesenheit (SZ: 326 = BTS: 299 [“having-been”] = BTS: 373 [“The character of having-been”]), and he does so clearly as the abstract noun to gewesen and Gewesen. Gewesenheit, however, Heidegger uses in §65 itself and elsewhere as the technical term for that ecstasy of the primordial temporality which corresponds to what traditionally has been called the past (e.g., “Future [Zukunft], having-been [Gewesenheit], and present [Gegenwart]” [SZ: 328 = BTS: 302 = BTS: 377]). Other than that, he has always used Gewesenheit only for a past that claims to reoccur and can, and shall, do so (see Fritsche 1999: 284-85 [endn. 57] or Heidegger 1998: 100-118). Thus, Heidegger uses gewesen, das Gewesen(e), and Gewesenheit always in the way it is always used in everyday language, namely to refer to some past or something in the past and not to any future.

Finally, Macquarrie and Robinson render Wiederholung and wiederholen in §74 (SZ: 385.19-386.26 = BTS: 352.25-353.19 = BTS: 437.13-438.21) as “repetition” and “to repeat” (Stambaugh has “retrieve”), and I adopt their translation also because, in German, the noun Wiederholung is most of the time, if not always, used in the sense of “repetition.” According to Sheehan, however, this is a mistranslation, for ever since Richardson’s book from 1963 scholars know that Heidegger’s wiederholen is closer to “to fetch” in the sense of “to go get somebody” and hence should be translated as “retrieval” or “retrieve” (Sheehan 2016: 489f.; see Sheehan 2015a: 183). Sheehan does not mention that, right at the beginning of my discussion of this issue, I quote Macquarrie and Robinson who, in a note, say the same thing as Richardson does (Fritsche 1999: 15f.), and I discuss this suggestion. In addition, I don’t infer from the word Wiederholung itself but rather from my interpretation of SZ: 385.24-386.9 (= BTS: 352.29-353.5 = BTS: 437.18-438.7) that Heidegger is talking in §74 of the repetition of the having-been of the German community of the people (see my next sections). Furthermore, American interpreters normally ignore that “to fetch” is not hol... wied... but simply hol... wied... in the sense of “to fetch” would be “to fetch back,” to retrieve for oneself something that one had had at some point but then had lost or given away (thus, the children’s verse: “Given (as a gift) is given (as a gift), wiederholen [and not just hol... J. F.] is theft [Geschenkt ist geschenkt, wiederholen ist gestohlen]!”)). Therefore, “to fetch” as a translation, or explication, of Wiederholung is simply wrong whether Wiederholung is used in the sense of a repetition or of hol... wied... In addition, even wiederholen in the sense of hol... wied... is a repetition, namely the repetition of, or the return to, the state in
which one had already had the item that one fetches back, “repetition” in the sense of “bringing back (to life) something that had disappeared” as opposed to, say, singing without a break the same song over and over again (see Fritsche 1999: 7-28, 37-68, 83f., 134f., 173f., 327-31 [n. 70], and often). In sum, Sheehan is wrong (and hasn’t learned anything in these matters since he began reading Richardson “some fifty years ago” [Sheehan 2015a: XI]). For, one must not translate Wiederholung as “retrieval” but rather as “repetition.”

2. The temporal Trajectory, the main Actor and the key Terms in §74 of Sein und Zeit

Regarding all three notions discussed in the preceding section, Sheehan makes the same mistake, namely to claim a later phase, or activity, as the exclusive content of the notion. A Gewesenheit as a past that shall reoccur does indeed approach us from out of the future, or is our futurity, but only because it is a past that calls upon us to re-realize it in the future. Similarly, a tradition or Überlieferung hands down possibilities to Dasein and enables Dasein to take them over. Sheehan does not give any example of Dasein’s freeing up of a possibility that it takes from somewhere, namely from a tradition. If he had thought about just one, he would have quickly realized that such freeing up is impossible without an activity of moving something from here to there, for Dasein moves this possibility from somewhere, the tradition, where it belonged to someone else or to no one into its own domain and from the past or present into the future. Therefore, not only a tradition and the activity of transmitting a tradition but even Sheehan’s activity of freeing up is, or implies, an act of handing down something, and it is simply impossible to cleanse Überlieferung of the aspect of handing down. Sheehan obviously does not notice that, both in the case of the Heidegger quotes from 1955 and in the context of §74 of Sein und Zeit, Überlieferung as a handing down accounts easily for the aspect that he labels “freing up.” Everyone understands without any thought the phrase that a tradition überliefert (hands down) possibilities for Dasein to take over, and everyone equally easily understands when one describes the activity of Dasein that has been made possible by the work of the tradition by saying, as Heidegger does in this context (SZ: 385; BTS: 360), that Dasein überliefert (hands down, takes over) a possibility to / for itself. If one likes, one can certainly label this activity and the one of the tradition an act of freeing up possibilities. However, one must not ignore, as Sheehan does, that this freeing up would not be possible without a tradition and a Dasein handing down possibilities in the sense of carrying them from somewhere to somewhere else. As to Wiederholung, it is the same as with Gewesenheit. A past that displays repeatable possibilities enables Dasein to repeat, or fetch back, these possibilities, and without such a past Dasein would not be able to do so.

As will become clear in the following sections, regarding Schicksal (fate) and Geschick (destiny), Sheehan makes the same mistake to declare the last phase, or the activity of Dasein having been made possible by something else preceding it, as the exclusive content of

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4 As I pointed out, the English prefix re- functions differently from the way the Latin re- and the German wieder- do (Fritsche 1999: 285-86 [endn. 58], 334-35 [endn. 72]). See some quotes from this context in Sheehan (2016: 490 n. 18). Anxious that they miss what seems to be the pet topic of his philosophico-religious career, Sheehan translates for the readers St. Augustine’s vivere moriendo (“live mortally” [Sheehan 2016: 496]) and lengthily references the quote. Other than that, he constantly boasts with untranslated foreign-language phrases but is obviously clueless even in the face of a little bit of amateurish linguistic coffee-table talk.
the notion. Through this consistently repeated mistake, an exemplary subjectivist misreading of *Sein und Zeit* and of German words, Sheehan establishes the individuals as the only actors in §74 and as those who individually freely forge their individual fates and collectively their common destiny. Despite his clamor that Macquarrie, Robinson, and Stambaugh have “misled scholars for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487) and despite the seeming of deep “originality” that Sheehan creates in his book *Making Sense of Heidegger*, his reading of §74 is, as I already pointed out (Fritsche 2016: 431), just a further example of what I labelled the “American” interpretation of authentic Dasein which one finds already in the early 1990s in Birmingham, Caputo, Fynsk, Guignon, and others, whose interpretations in all their differences share the common denominator of turning Heidegger’s “Germanic” notion of *Schicksal* and *Geschick* upside down and presenting individual Dasein as the creator of its *Schicksal* (e.g., Caputo: “Dasein gives itself a fate” [Fritsche 1999: 283f. {n. 51}]), the postmodern version of the proverbial American self-made man who takes his fate resolutely into his own hands. In addition, with the exception of Sheehan’s claim regarding *Gewesen*, these authors make, with no or hardly any discussion, similarly wrong claims concerning the meaning of the words in §74 (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 207–15 and the index of names). In brief, to render, as Sheehan does, “*Überlieferung*” as “exclusively Dasein’s activity of freeing up,” “*Gewesen*” as “exclusively Dasein’s futurity,” or “*Schicksal*” and “*Geschick*” as “exclusively my / our forging, freely and by myself / ourselves, of my / our future” is as good as saying that since sunlight makes it possible for plants to grow, sunlight is by definition nothing but the growth of plants or that since stars are available for navigation, stars are essentially nothing but navigation.

Both Sheehan and I regard §74 as, in his words, “the emphatic climax of *Being and Time*” (Sheehan 2015: 381) as a whole (see Fritsche 1999: 29-67, 274-79 [endn. 25]; more concisely Fritsche 2012: 258-66, Fritsche 2014: 57-70), but our interpretations of that section could hardly differ more. For him, the actors are the individuals, and a community plays only a passive role while, for me, the community turns out to be the main player. In addition, for him the past occurs only as a pool out of which Dasein freely chooses one or the other possibility while, for me, the past community as the main player claims to be re-realized (see Sheehan 2016: 492-497). Thus, we see different temporal trajectories in which for me the past, for Sheehan and the entire American interpretation, however, the future has primacy. As Sheehan puts it:

Oblivious of the fundamental pattern that Heidegger had laid out in §§41 [in which Heidegger uses none of the three terms presented in my preceding section, J. F.] and 65 and that he builds on in §74, Fritsche makes resolve into its exact opposite. It is no longer a matter of confronting one’s mortal future and returning to the present to free up an available possibility. Instead, Fritsche claims that Heidegger “affirms the primacy of the past” [inasmuch as Destiny appeals to Dasein] to step back from the future [...] to [the] past [in order to press] forward into the present to “repeat” [...] a pure *Volksgemeinschaft*. (Sheehan 2016: 498f.)

As to the three terms from my preceding section, *gewesen* occurs five times in §74. Heidegger talks of “a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been [gleichursprünglich *gewesend*]” (SZ: 385 = BTS: 352). “Equiprimordial” is in §65 and elsewhere Heidegger’s
term for the equiprimordiality of the three ecstasies of primordial temporality (SZ: 329 = BTS: 302), with Gewesenheit, as was pointed out, as the technical term for what traditionally has been called the past. In the next paragraph he says that the repetition that Dasein performs is the move back to “the possibilities of the Da-sein that has been [des dagewesenen Da-seins]” (SZ: 385 = BTS: 352); that Dasein performs the repetition “of a possibility that has been [gewesen Existenzmöglichkeit]” (SZ: 385 = BTS: 352); and that this repetition “of a possibility that has been [einer gewesenen Möglichkeit]” discloses “the Da-sein that has been there [das dagewesene Dasein]” (SZ: 385 = BTS: 352) in a certain way. In all four of these quotes, it is not the repeating Dasein but rather the possibility that this Dasein chooses that is called gewesen and which is in the past or comes from it. In his “Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation” (Sheehan 2016: 525-31) of §74, making the same mistake as the one regarding Überlieferung and the other words, Sheehan renders these words in the spirit of the American interpretation arbitrarily and falsely as “already-available” (Sheehan 2016: 529) and adds a note in which he tacitly acknowledges that Heidegger uses here gewesen for the past and not, as in Sheehan’s general claim, the future (Sheehan 2016: 529 n. 100; compare with 530 n. 103).

In a summary toward the end of §74, Heidegger attributes to “Gewesenheit” the “unique priority of what is historical” (BTS: 353 = BTM: 438 [“peculiarly privileged position in the historical”] = SZ: 386 [“eigentümlichen Vorrang im Geschichtlichen”]), or says that the “occurrence of authentic history has its weight in having-been [Gewesenheit]” (BTS: 353 = SZ: 386f.). In other words, in historicity Gewesenheit and not, as Sheehan and the “American” interpretation in general has it, the future or the present is the dominant dimension. In his “Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation” of §74, Sheehan explicitly admits that Heidegger uses Gewesenheit here “in its traditional sense of what-has-been-and-still-is-operative” (Sheehan 2016: 530 n. 103). Thus, in the entire §74 Heidegger uses gewesen in its everyday usage to characterize a past and not Dasein’s futurity. Sheehan does not comment on what, for him only and not even for the other promoters of the “American” interpretation of §74, is an inconsistency between this section and §65 on the part of Heidegger with regard to one of his life-long pet notions, and Sheehan does not explain either in what, according to his interpretation, the priority of Gewesenheit in the historical consists. Indeed, it is difficult for him inasmuch as, according to the “American” interpretation, Dasein moves between the future and the present and uses the past in principle just as a pool of possibilities, none of which has any obligatory force for Dasein (see Fritsche 1999: 7–13, 207–15, and passim). By contrast, according to my interpretation, such sentences are a very appropriate summary.5

One has here a striking example of Sheehan’s absurd hermeneutical arrogance or incompetence: he predicates his interpretation of §74 on the assumption that, in §74, Heidegger makes Dasein enact a notion of Gewesenheit that flies flatly in the face of the way Germans use that word and which Heidegger has, Sheehan assumes, presented in a very short passage in §65, and he acknowledges at the same time that, in §74, Heidegger uses Gewesenheit in the

5 In contrast to me, adherents of the “American” interpretation have to explain why Heidegger confines the repeatable possibilities to those coming from the past, why he is so “critical” of the They, and why Dasein cannot invent possibilities. However, they ignore these issues.
opposite meaning, the one everyone is familiar with. Probably, Sheehan will admit as well that everywhere else in *Sein und Zeit*, including §65 itself, Heidegger uses *Gewesenheit* in the meaning familiar to everyone. Thus, he maintains that, in *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger uses *Gewesenheit* frequently and that he does so always in the meaning familiar to everyone, except once where he uses it in a meaning that is the precise opposite of the usual one without indicating this in any way. Still, according to Sheehan, this meaning is operative in §74 (and already in Heidegger’s discussion of resoluteness and the call of conscience [Sheehan 2015a: 158-178]) even though in that section, too, Heidegger uses *Gewesenheit* in the way familiar to everyone.\(^6\)

It adds to the incomprehensibility of his claim that, as the interpretations of Birmingham, Caputo, Fynsk, Guignon, and others show, the “American” interpretation of §74 does not need Sheehan’s understanding of the term *Gewesenheit*, and he didn’t need to make any ado about the other words either. Perhaps, he felt the need to ground the notion of historicity in the structure of care (*Sorge*) better than, he thought, Heidegger himself had done. In the process, he completely cleansed Heidegger’s vocabulary of its “Germanic” content, took out a certain wit that one can find in some variants of the “American” interpretation, and removed motifs in others that could still, in a way, remind one of the political and cultural conflicts at Heidegger’s time or which were the philosophical and political options pursued by leftists or other antipodes of Heidegger, such as Walter Benjamin (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 207–15 and the index of names). The result is an unsurpassably boring interpretation of “the emphatic climax” (Sheehan 2015: 381) of *Sein und Zeit*. Indeed, it can happen that, in the course of some existential crisis (“confronting one’s mortal future” [Sheehan 2016: 498]), one thinks about what one has been doing all the time (“returning to the present” [Sheehan 2016: 498]), and gives up one’s job to engage in an activity which one got to know in one way or the other (“to free up an available possibility” [Sheehan 2016: 498]). No one needs years of studying Heidegger to come up with such a banality that looks like a deep insight only if one is obsessed with finitude and mortality and entertains a caricature of the notion of the modern subject.\(^7\)

According to Sheehan, *Überlieferung* is performed exclusively by Dasein, the act of freeing up an available possibility (Sheehan 2016: 487-489). By contrast, for me it is, as in the Heidegger quotes from 1955 and in everyday language, in the first place the past. I develop the first step of this *Überlieferung* in an interpretation of the paragraph in which *Überliefern* occurs for the first time in §74 and whose main actor is, in my view, something that definitely comes from the past, namely *Erbe* (legacy, heritage) (SZ: 383.31-384.14 = BTS: 351.13-32 = BTM: 435.15-37) (Fritsche 1999: 47-65; in the spirit of the “American” interpretation Stambaugh turns the decisive sentence upside down [Fritsche 1999: 263 {endn. 32}]). Sheehan ignores this part.

He rather targets my interpretations of the passage on the community of the people and destiny (SZ: 384.29-384.38 = BTS: 352.2-10 = BTM: 436.14-23) and of the one on *Wiederholung* (repetition) (SZ: 385.24-386.9 = BTS: 352.34-353.5 = BTM: 437.22-438.7). I infer my

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\(^{6}\) For a more recent treatment of Aristotle’s notion of τὸ τι ἐλεύθερον than the ones Sheehan adduces (Sheehan 2016: 491 n. 22), see Fritsche 1997, which could help Sheehan to cure himself of his mirage regarding *Gewesenheit*.

\(^{7}\) See also my footnote 16.
interpretation of the repetition of the community of the people from both of them and, in the final step, from the last two sentences of the passage on Wiederholung, the ones on erwidern and Widerruf (SZ: 386.4-6 = BTS: 352.42-353.3 [“responds” and “disavowal”] = BTM: 438.1-4 [“reciprocative rejoinder” and “disavowal”]), whose decisive importance I have stressed from the beginning (Fritsche 1999: IXf.) and which I discuss with even more than the notorious German Gründlichkeit (thoroughness) (Fritsche 1999: 7-28, 65-67, 83f., 134f., 173f., 327-31 [endn. 70], and often) because I was aware that in particular the mistranslation of the first of these two sentences (which Sheehan adopts [Sheehan 2015a: 180 n. 89]) was an expression of the “American” interpretation of historicity and strongly reinforced it (for a particularly striking confirmation, in addition to the authors I discuss in Fritsche 1999, see Fritsche 2012: 276 [n. 21]).

The first passage I treat more in detail in my next sections. As to the second, Sheehan claims, as always without any discussion, that my mistranslation of Wiederholung (repetition) leads to

the utterly bizarre meaning [Fritsche] has to torture out of erwidern / Erwiderung at SZ 386.4-6 = BTM 438.1-4 (submitting to Fate-and-Destiny!) to get them to dance to the choreography of his ‘Drama of Historical Dasein.’ (Sheehan 2016: 490)

He should be alerted that, in an article on the question of Heidegger and National Socialism in a handbook on Heidegger (that is, in a genre in which one is not supposed to develop “fancy” thoughts but to present the state of the debate and reliable information), one of the two or three major authorities on Heidegger in contemporary Germany, Dieter Thomä, a native German speaker and in no way a “foe” of the thinker, refers once to my book—precisely to my interpretation of erwidern to reject, as I had done, what I had labelled the “American” interpretation of §74 (Thomä 2003: 145-46).

3. Gemeinschaft (Community) in Sein und Zeit

Sheehan claims that my interpretation of §74 is wrong because the notion of community occurs only in this section (Sheehan 2016: 493) and because Heidegger shows in it “how we can [...] forge a common destiny, a Ge-schick” (Sheehan 2015: 381). Both claims are false. In his lecture course from the summer of 1925, in the chapter that corresponds to the one on being-with-one-another and the They in Sein und Zeit Heidegger says explicitly that on the basis of being-with-one-another in the world Dasein “can develop the various possibilities of community [Gemeinschaft] as well as of society [Gesellschaft]” (Heidegger 1992: 241). As a matter of fact, relying on the sections before and anticipating some points from §27, Heidegger just summarizes in §26 in his own vernacular and a variation of Hegel’s vocabulary one strand, the more radical one, in the literature on community and society, namely that, historically, the pre-modern communities, the historically first mode of being-with-one-another, were pushed aside by liberalism, the second mode of being-with-one-another, and that, as by no means all of the then communitarians assumed, the social democratic welfare state, the third mode, is just an intensification of liberalism. At the same time, Heidegger develops a fourth mode of being-with-one-another, the anticipation of a rightist revolution (see for §26 Fritsche 1999:
274-279 [endn. 25], Fritsche 2012: 258-61, Fritsche 2014: 60-64). Furthermore, Heidegger claims that the vulgar understanding of the call of conscience interprets it as the voice of universal reason, and he presents as this vulgar interpretation of the call of conscience a theory of modern society that was also commonplace in the literature on community and society, namely that modern societies are based on arithmetical justice—the justice of business activities and business exchanges—and institutionalized procedures of discussion as opposed to the proportional justice in communities (Tönnies 1957: 186 = Tönnies 1979: 163, Fritsche 2012: 264f. [endn. 33], Fritsche 2014: 66-68). As a matter of fact, the issue of community and society even determines the whole structure, or choreography, of Sein und Zeit with its culmination in the script for a rightist revolution in §74 (see Fritsche 1999: 29-67, 274-79 [endn. 25]; more concisely Fritsche 2012: 258-66, Fritsche 2014: 57-70).  

Heidegger also adopts the then usual characterizations of community and society. Scheler talked of the “principle of summation [Summenprinzip]” as the principle of modern thinking according to which society and everything else is nothing more than the mere sum of its parts and thus dependent on them and determined by them. According to Scheler, this does indeed hold for society but not for organisms and communities. Each organism and each community is a totality that has a life of its own and organizes, and determines, its parts, each of which has its existence and peculiar character from the totality of the organism or community. Scheler develops wordily how society emerged when, in modernity, the integrating powers of community were weakened by the rising individualism or egotism (see the long quote Fritsche 1999: 113f.). This distinction between society and community was commonplace among the then communitarians. In the classic book on the issue, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society) from 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies expresses the same idea when he says, for instance, that a society is “a mechanical aggregate and artifact” (Tönnies 1957: 35 = Tönnies 1979: 4), a “mere co-existence of persons independent of each other [bloßes Nebeneinander von einander unabhängiger Personen]” (Tönnies 1957: 34 = Tönnies 1979: 4; replacement of “peoples” with “persons” is mine, J. F.); that are “not essentially bound together / obliged to each other [wesentlich verbunden], but essentially separated from each other” (Tönnies 1979: 34, to be added before “However, [...] unifying factors” [Tönnies 1957: 65]); none of whom grants the other something, or does something for the other, unless he gets back in return an equivalent or more (Tönnies 1957: 65 = Tönnies 1979: 34); and amongst whom “hostilities are natural and only veiled and, for that reason, [...] break out easily” (Tönnies 1957: 170 [translation changed, J. F.] = Tönnies 1979: 143) because society is a matter of “egotistical” (Tönnies 1957: 185 = Tönnies 1979: 162) individuals, i.e., persons—in brief, society is “merely abstract reason, that reason in which every rational being qua definition partakes, inasmuch as this abstract reason is conceived to be willing and acting” (Tönnies 1957: 71 = Tönnies 1979: 39). By contrast, a community is a “living organism” (Tönnies 1957: 35 = Tönnies 1979: 4) and as such

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8 Sheehan, after all a professor at a department for religious studies, claims, without reference and falsely, that Fritsche regards as the real issue in Sein und Zeit the “Manichean struggle between society and community” (Sheehan 2016: 485), a remark which betrays a deep misunderstanding of my whole book and perhaps also of the whole of Heidegger inasmuch as I emphasize what was Heidegger’s basic motive in Sein und Zeit and throughout his entire career, namely the anti-Manichean notion of a beginning and a fall-away-from it (and the covering up of the fall-away: “forgetting of a forgetting” [Fritsche 1999: 204 and often]) (see Fritsche 1999: 29-67, 274-79 [endn. 25]; Fritsche 2014: 57-105; see also Fritsche 2016a: 585f.).
a whole […] that is [as in contrast to a society, J. F.] not put together by the parts, but rather has / maintains these parts as dependent on it and as conditioned by it; […] therefore, it itself is as a whole, thus as form real and substantial [Ganzes {...}, welches nicht von den Teilen zusammengesetzt wird, sondern sie als von sich abhängig und durch sich bedingte hat; {...} also es selber als Ganzes, mithin als Form wirklich und substantiell ist]“ (Tönnies 1979: 5f.)

At the end of §26 of Sein und Zeit Heidegger writes:

In that Da-sein is at all, it has the kind of being of being-with-one-another. Being-with-one-another cannot be understood as a summative result [summatives Resultat] of the occurrence of several “subjects.” Encountering a number of “subjects” itself is possible only by treating the others encountered in their Mitda-sein merely as “numerals.” This number is discovered only by a definite being with and toward one another. “Reckless” [“rücksichtslose”] being-with “reckons” with others [“rechnet” mit den Anderen] without seriously “counting on them” or even wishing “to have anything to do” with them. (BTS: 117-18 = SZ: 125; replacement of “inconsiderate” with “reckless” is mine, J. F.; for Heidegger’s notion of Rechnen, see Fritsche 2016b)

As will become clearer in the following sections, Heidegger is here not talking about several individuals forging a common destiny in Sheehan’s sense, and he is not just talking in general about being-with-one-another. Rather, he uses the same formula as Scheler does in order to identify, in the “spirit” of the whole of §26, the “real” being-with-one-another and community, and he offers his formula for the emergence of society: the modern individual, the person or subject, no longer has the concern that members of a community have for each other, namely the “[c]oncernful taking care” or “taking care of concern” (BTS: 116; the “[s]olicitous concern” or “concernful solicitude” [BTM: 161]; “fürsorgende Besorgen” or “besorgende[n] Fürsorge” [SZ: 124]); the modern individual rather recklessly reckons with the others, i.e.,

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9 Loomis translates: “a totality which is not a mere aggregation of its parts but one which is made up of these parts in such a manner that they are dependent upon and conditioned by the totality, and that such a body as a totality and hence as a form possesses reality and substance.” (Tönnies 1957: 36) My literal translation of the first phrase of the quote is important because of Heidegger’s language (see the beginning of my section 4).

Two further remarks might be useful: 1) Tönnies does not say that, so to speak ontogenetically, phylogenetically or systematically, the entities that become, or are, parts of a community are first independent of the whole and that later on, however, the whole makes them dependent on it. Rather, the whole has always already kept the parts as conditioned by it. 2) Tönnies uses here the vocabulary of Aristotle. An organism consists of its essential form (say, to-be-a-human-being, something immaterial) and its material parts (say, the head, the legs, the arms, etc., each consisting of flesh, bones, etc. as matter). What is a community? Just the essential form or the composite of essential form and all the material parts? Tönnies is not very clear on this issue but seems to say here and elsewhere that it is just the essential form (which can be labelled the “[true] whole,” since it is the essential form that determines which material parts the entire organism as a whole has). To say so makes it much easier regarding an option in the debates about the revitalization of community among rightists (see my footnote 2 and my section 5). In modernity, the parts of the community change (i.e., the individuals become egoists, in the first place) to the effect that the community disappears and society is established (the formula of Hegel [who was by no means a communitarian] for this process was that the accidents become substances). To say that community is in the first place the essential form enables one to say that the revitalized, or repeated, community need not necessarily have all the parts that it had when it was for the first time real and that it can have parts that it did not have at that time (see my section 5).
treats them and the whole society as mere means of its own egotism and self-promotion (see Fritsche 2016b).

4. Sheehan on *Geschick* (Destiny) in §74 of *Sein und Zeit*

In §74, Heidegger determines *Geschick* as the “occurrence [Geschehen] of the community [der Gemeinschaft], of {the} people [des Volkes]” (BTS: 352 = SZ: 384) and continues:

Destiny is not composed of individual fates [setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen] nor can being-with-one-another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects [Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte]. These fates are already guided beforehand [im vorhinein schon geleitet] in being-with-one-another in the same world and in the resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] for definite possibilities. In communication [Mitteilung] and in battle [Kampf] the power of destiny first becomes free [In der Mitteilung und im Kampf wird die Macht des Geschickes erst frei]. (BTS: 352.5-10 = SZ: 384.31-38; the phrase “setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen” is literally translated “does not put itself together out of singular fates”; i.e., it is a variation of the first, negative, part of Tönnies’ definition of an organism and of community quoted in my preceding section; “mutual” has no equivalent in the German text, and might be misleading; Heidegger refers to the contract theories in early-modern philosophy or just to subjects in general; they kommen zusammen vor on the same spot, i.e., they are spatially in the same area and can, as subjects, form, through contracts, a society but they don’t make up “real” being-with-one-another, a community; in other words, Heidegger’s “occurrence of several subjects [together on the same spot]” is equivalent to Tönnies’ formula of society, quoted in my preceding section, as a “mere co-existence of people independent of each other.”)

“Occurrence” is an appropriate translation of the word *Zusammenvorkommen* in Heidegger’s phrase “Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte,” but as a translation of *Geschehen* in Heidegger’s determination of *Geschick* (“occurrence [Geschehen] of the community [der Gemeinschaft], of {the} people [des Volkes]” (BTS: 352 = SZ: 384) it is probably too pale (Macquarrie and Robinson have “historizing” [BTM: 436]). *Geschehen* in everyday language is the “happening / taking place / coming out” of something, and Heidegger uses the word here in this very meaning for the coming out of destiny (see my section 5). In addition, he

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10 When saying close to the beginning of §26 that the others are encountered from the world in which Dasein dwells and not from discriminating one’s own subject from other subjects (SZ: 119 = BTS: 112), Heidegger does not deny that a world of subjects is possible and real. He just says that this world presupposes resources that it hasn’t produced and that it denies (SZ: 124f. = BTS: 116-18). Scheler says in the long quote Fritsche 1999: 113f. that the pariahs of community have destroyed community. Since, at that time, he was still a rightist (see my footnote 2) and assumed that the Jews had established capitalism (Fritsche 1999: 106-24), he will mean the Jews as Heidegger probably also, or mainly, thinks of them when talking about the recklessly reckoning Dasein (see Fritsche 2016b). Referring to Fritsche 2012: 260A.12-13 Sheehan says that I say that §27 of *Being and Time* is about capitalism (Sheehan 2016: 519), while I only maintain that, by the first character of the They in §27, Abständigkeit (distantiality), Heidegger means competitive behavior in capitalism and not, as most or all American interpreters assume, conformity and conformism (Fritsche 2003: 75f.; Fritsche 2012: 258.45-260.14). Sheehan translates Heidegger’s *Man* (the They) wholly inappropriately as “the crowd-self” (Sheehan 2015a: 144).

11 Replacement of “a people” with “{the} people” is mine, J. F.; see my footnote 3.
identifies Geschick and Gemeinschaft and in the second step—pace Sheehan, who in his obsession for dictionaries (Sheehan 2016: 487 n. 10 [“到时,” “使”], 490 n. 20 [“对答”], 505 n. 65 [“无根基状态”]) seems to be unterbelichtet (underdeveloped) when it comes to grammar, precisely through the “apposition” (Sheehan 2016: 517) of the respective words—Gemeinschaft and the Volk. Both steps are his answer to the main question every rightist had to answer, namely, which community it is that should be repeated. In the first step, he most probably implicitly fends off theoretically, or otherwise in a transcendent manner, grounded concepts of history, such as in Scheler, and in the second he declares the Volk, the Volksgemeinschaft, to be the relevant community: Geschick is the coming out of the (primary or only) community, (namely / i.e.) the Volk (and neither Scheler’s Catholic love-community nor any other of those that have been suggested by other communitarians) (Fritsche 1999: 97-100, 136-140; Fritsche 2016: 430-31; Fritsche 2016a: 527-8, 590-1) (see also my section 5).12

Sheehan accuses me of turning Heidegger’s concept of Geschick on its head (Sheehan 2016: 493). For, according to him, Heidegger shows in §74 how an individual freely chooses its own individual destiny, its fate, (Sheehan 2015a: 182-84; Sheehan 2015: 382 n. 49) and “how we can also forge a common destiny, a Ge-schick” (Sheehan 2015: 381):

Far from meaning “destiny” as Fritsche would have it, [the term Geschick] refers to the common future, the Ge-schick, that a community freely choses for itself (for example, in ratifying the U.S. Constitution of 1789). (Sheehan 2016: 493)

According to Sheehan, it is in the three quoted sentences on destiny (BTS: 352.5-10 = SZ: 384.31-38) that Heidegger develops how several individuals forge a common destiny (Sheehan 2016: 528). There are ten problems with his interpretation.

1) The supposed actors, the authentic individuals forging their destiny, don’t occur at all, neither in the heading (“the coming out of the community, the people”) nor in these three sentences themselves, since Heidegger uses the notion of the subject for the modern individual and modern philosophy of subjectivity and not for authentic Daseins; or, if indeed they are meant by “subjects,” they occur not as agents and actors, but only to avoid a possible misunderstanding regarding their status in relation to destiny and being-with-one-another. By contrast, the supposed product of the activities of the individuals, Geschick, is the only subject of the heading, and is in these three sentences twice the subject of the sentence, and obviously has power.

2) According to Sheehan, Heidegger shows in §74 also how an individual produces its own individual destiny, its fate (Sheehan 2015: 382 n. 49; Sheehan 2015a: 182-84). However, in the quote fate occurs as something guided by what is certainly not the individual whose fate it is.

3) How is Heidegger reasoning here? In his “Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation” (Sheehan 2016: 525-31) of §74 Sheehan paraphrases the three sentences thus:

12 See my footnote 2.
A Ge-schick isn’t the sum total of individual Schicksals (just as social existence isn’t the gluing together of individual subjects). Rather, individual Schicksals are already guided by our social existence: our living together in the same world of meaning and choosing certain possibilities together. The Ge-schick of a community gets freed up only as we communicate with one another and struggle together. (Sheehan 2016: 528)

It is only here that Sheehan substantiates his claim concerning Geschick, and he obviously regards his paraphrase as a sufficient validation, since he leaves it without any comment. Thus, he does not say whether an individual fate is here the one that an individual frees up for itself or whether an individual has a fate already before it frees up its individual fate. In both cases he would have to explain why Heidegger, when supposedly talking about individuals forging a common destiny, does not address this issue explicitly but rather talks explicitly about something different, namely the individual fates. In addition, he says of them something that is difficult to square with Sheehan’s claim that, according to Heidegger in the very same §74, an individual forges its own fate. Furthermore, Sheehan does not explain either what this guidance in the second sentence means, and who, or what, is guiding the individual fates. The only candidate in the context of the second sentence is destiny. However, according to Sheehan this is not possible since, according to him, destiny is produced freely by the individuals and as such cannot guide them, at least not without further explications on Heidegger’s part. In addition, Sheehan obviously assumes (“Rather”) that the fact that the individual fates are already guided rules out that destiny is composed of individual fates, but he doesn’t explain either this composition and what its absence means for destiny and the individual fates. Finally, he does not explain what “[to] struggle together” might mean, neither in general nor regarding his example of the American constitution. He seems to emphasize the cooperation of those who conduct the Kampf, but the primary aspect of a Kampf is that it is directed against someone, against the foe.

4) Sheehan does not notice these unclear points and inconsistencies or is willing to pay them as the price for his introduction of “us” as the only actors, an introduction that requires a grave manipulation of the text. Even though none of the three sentences contains Überlieferung, neither as a noun nor as a verb or participle, even though none of them contains “us” let alone “us” as actors and as the only actors, even though the subject of the first and the third sentence is destiny and its power, and even though, in the second sentence, individual fates and, by implication, the individuals themselves are not producing anything but are said to be guided by something, Sheehan smuggles into the third sentence his false translation of überliefern and liefern—his pet-word, “to free up”—to turn the passage grammatically on its head and present “us” as the exclusive initiators and agents in the communication and struggle in which we freely forge a common destiny. However, this move is for six further reasons improbable or impossible.

5) Since “communication” obviously makes most, if not all, American interpreters, including Sheehan, think of the back and forth of suggestions and arguments that individuals exchange, it is a false translation of Heidegger’s word Mitteilung. For, if Heidegger had meant such exchanges, he could have easily chosen something from a rich list of words, each of which clearly and unambiguously conveys such interactions, namely Auseinandersetzung, Be-
redung, Besprechung, Debatte, Dialog, Diskussion, Erörterung, Gespräch, Meinungsaustausch, Rede und Gegenrede, Unterredung, Verhandlung, or even Beratung. However, he uses the word Mitteilung, and a Mitteilung in general and also in Heidegger (SZ: 162, 168 = BTS: 151f., 157) is primarily a one-way communication in which person A informs B about something or makes B share—or, as Heidegger says at some point, “co-share”—something that A already has. Especially superiors, people with power, administrations and bureaucracies deliver Mitteilungen (in Mitteilungsblättern), or bosses when they fire someone (“Herewith, I teile Ihnen mit [inform you] that you are fired.”), cases in which the recipient is not supposed to start a discussion (see Fritsche 1999: 347-51 [endn. 24]). Otherwise, atmospheres, moods, or other things that are not human thoughts teilen sich mit (communicate themselves, spread themselves out) to humans as, for instance, the solemn atmosphere of this memorial to every visitor, or God to the humans through his miracles and other deeds.

6) In addition, frei werden is normally not used for something that has been created in the process of becoming free but rather for something that has already existed before. When one says that, through the burst of a nuclear reactor, radioactivity, in this tumultuous meeting a lot of aggression or disagreement, the animal that had been captivated, through the fall of the wall in 1989 the citizens of the former GDR wird / werden frei or freigesetzt, everyone self-evidently understands that the respective subjects were not produced in this event but pre-existed it and just change their status—and now are acted out or can act according to what they are (see Fritsche 1999: 47-65).

7) Sheehan will perhaps say that, since the constitution “gets freed up” (Sheehan 2016: 528) by the individuals, it has already existed in a certain way before its ratification. Even if this might be the case, for his interpretation to work Sheehan has to assume that Heidegger, without indicating this in any way, uses the notions of Schicksal and Geschick to mean the precise opposite of their usual meanings. For, both those who “believe” in fate and destiny and those who don’t do so assume that individuals don’t produce their Schicksal or Geschick. Rather, Geschick and Schicksal precede them, and make themselves at some point in time in one way or another known to the individuals. According to rightists, the individual shall accept his or her Schicksal, since doing so is demanded by it and is in no way fatalistic but, to the contrary, redeems and ennobles the individual (Fritsche 1999: 322–23 [endn. 57], Fritsche 2015: 433), 13 while others say that accepting it is a matter of prudence, since, if it is really fate, one will not be able to escape it. Or, in a broader sense, anything “inescapable” is, as Scheler put it, “fate—not choice [Schicksal—nicht Wahl]” (Fritsche 1999: 143. Anything

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13 According to rightists, submitting to destiny and the Volksgemeinschaft relieves one from the burden of autonomy (see, e.g., Tillich’s observation [Fritsche 1999: 174f.]) and opens up a being-with-one-another in trust, love, etc. for the other Daseins and the Volksgemeinschaft. Heidegger’s logic is “a logic not of reconciliation or of dialectical mediation but rather one of transfiguration” (Fritsche 1999: 323 [endn. 57]; see also Fritsche 2016c), a characteristic of Sein und Zeit to which the promoters of the American interpretation of §74 and even the professor at a department for religious studies are deaf. The sentence with erwidern (see the end of my Section 2) is one of Heidegger’s formulations for such redeeming submission, and so is his formula, “Die […] sich überliefernde Entschlossenheit” (SZ: 385.23-24 = BTS: 352.29-30 [“Resoluteness that […] hands itself down”]). Pace Sheehan (Sheehan 2016: 489), in the context in which it appears everyone understands this formula (see Fritsche 1999: 15-19, 46-65) while no one would understand Heidegger, if he meant, as Sheehan claims, that the resolute Dasein frees up, this time around not a possibility for itself, but rather itself for choosing an authentic possibility (Sheehan 2016: 489). From the early 1930s on, Heidegger’s pet word for that type of submission will be sich fügen in (the call of the Anfang [beginning], Being, etc.).
Scheler, Hitler, and Heidegger say in sentences with \textit{Geschick} and \textit{Schicksal} can easily be understood on the assumption that they use these words in their everyday meaning and the related ones (see Fritsche 1999: 71–87, 89–92, 131–36, 140–41, 143, 289–92 [endn. 66] et passim). In the case of \textit{Schicksal}, Sheehan explicitly acknowledges that in order for his interpretation to work he has to assume that Heidegger uses \textit{Schicksal} in this perverted way (Sheehan 2015a: 183; see Fritsche 2015: 432f.). When emphasizing that \textit{Geschick} in §74 does not mean “destiny” (Sheehan 2016: 493), he obviously acknowledges the same regarding \textit{Geschick}, since in his list of twelve terms allegedly mistranslated in both English translations he has said that “\textit{Geschick} is not ‘Destiny’ (supervening, necessary, and inevitable)” (Sheehan 2016: 487).

8) Those who are, according to Sheehan, the exclusive actors in these three short sentences on destiny, namely the resolute Daseins, don’t occur at all in them. Heidegger uses the notion of \textit{Geschick} in a private language in which it means the precise opposite of its meaning in everyday parlance without indicating this fact in any way, and he uses the vocabulary of a one-way communication and fight against a foe that is the opposite of the to-and-fro of the discussions in which several Daseins freely forge the common ground on which to live together. How could Heidegger assume anyone would understand what he was saying? Or, for that matter, how could he himself be sure that, when rereading the text at a later point, he would know what he had said? Did he write the text intentionally in such a way that only US-American postmodernists in the 1990s and, twenty years later, Sheehan would get his point?

9) While the role of facing one’s mortality is pretty obvious in the case of an individual Dasein forging its fate, it is less so regarding several Daseins forging their common destiny. Sheehan does not offer any comment on this issue either. However, no matter what he would come up with—his interpretation of fate along the lines of a midlife crisis is as a whole utterly trivial, and so is at least the first half of his interpretation of destiny. Why does Heidegger, if Sheehan is right, not just say something like: “As we all know, the citizens of a state can give themselves a new constitution and the founders of a rabbit breeders association statutes. I say of them that they ‘freely forge their \textit{Geschick},’ since, in my opinion, the Germanic notion of \textit{Geschick} has to be perverted because […]]. Note, however, dear reader, that, despite these reservations regarding this Germanic understanding of \textit{Geschick}, I will for reasons that I will never explain use in my history of Being, which I will start to develop in about five years, again the Germanic notion of destiny and fate, which one must not, of course, mix up with the Asian one [see Fritsche 1999: 140-42, J. F.]). In the meantime let me add that I am sure that such formations of a common destiny will, just as the creation of an individual fate, finally work out only if, say, all the rabbit breeders or a sufficiently large number of them, at any rate, has authentically faced their mortality.”?

10) Finally, after Hitler’s “seizure of power” Heidegger himself claimed that he had anticipated in \textit{Sein und Zeit} this “new reality” (see Fritsche 2014: 207-11), and he said in 1936 in Rome to Karl Löwith that his notion of historicity was the basis of his engagement with National Socialism (see Fritsche 1999: 216-18).\footnote{According to Löwith’s thesis of empty decisionism from 1939, the absence of criteria for resoluteness and decision in \textit{Sein und Zeit} made Heidegger a conformist and as such collapse into National Socialism. In 1940, he wrote that his critique of Heidegger was also a self-critique. As a matter of fact, his interpretation is a projection of the very idiosyncratic right-wing radicalism of his youth onto Heidegger. His superficial texts on the issue of}
nothing to do with National Socialism would have to show why one is entitled to dismiss Heidegger’s own assessment, which Sheehan does not do.

Sheehan assumes his paraphrase doesn’t need any additional explication, justification, or argument. This is in line with his general dogmatic and authoritarian procedure. However, in this case there might be a further reason for his sparseness. For, in his book, Making Sense of Heidegger, he talks only about Schicksal and not about destiny (see Sheehan 2015a: 178-83). Thus, it is possible that the difference between Schicksal and Geschick has escaped him throughout the fifty-four years he has been reading Heidegger (see Sheehan 2015a: XI) and that it needed the “canard” (Sheehan 2016: 486) of the Frenchman Faye’s book to open his eyes. Overwhelmed by his discovery, ashamed about his ignorance, as his default-reaction, or just for the fun of it he then denies his shortcoming and projects it onto someone else, for he blames me for ignoring the difference between Schicksal and Geschick (Sheehan 2016: 485 n. 6, 494)—even though he himself quotes a sentence of mine in which I distinguish between these two notions (and do so, in this respect and in this respect only, in the same way as he does, namely that Schicksal pertains to the individual and Geschick to the community) (Sheehan 2016: 501) and even though I do so at other places as well and never mix them up.

Heidegger and National Socialism, paradigmatic examples of guilt by association, would have certainly gone unnoticed without his reputation as one of Heidegger’s very distinguished students. In 1948, he called his critique from 1939 in a private letter a “defence of Heidegger.” It was a defence inasmuch as Löwith had argued that empty decisionism was the logical outcome of Western philosophy and hence Heidegger (and he himself) its legitimate vanguard. In addition, in that year he published in the United States of America a paper in which he presented the template of the “American” interpretation of Sein und Zeit and its §74. This interpretation shares with the empty-decisionism interpretation the assumptions of the absence of criteria in Being and Time and that the existential nihilism is the vanguard of philosophy. However, this nihilism no longer collapses into National Socialism, but is the only logically coherent philosophical position that lives up to the condition of modernity, namely sheer contingency. As one sees, the step from the empty-decisionism interpretation to the “American” and postmodern interpretation is very easy: one just has to regard the absence of criteria as the successful result of Heidegger’s heroic effort to lead thinking out of metaphysics and the rule of universals, an interpretative move that one could very nicely observe in the 1990s in the American literature, when, say, Charles Guignon explicitly took the empty-decisionism interpretation as the starting point for his postmodern interpretation, and others did so implicitly (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 207-15, 216-18). In this way, Löwith (who had taught for some years in the United States and whose works were published there but who was also very influential in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s where he taught at the university of Heidelberg) became the “founding father” of the most influential line of critique of Heidegger and, at the same time, of the most influential line of celebrating Heidegger as the hero of postmodernity. Both lines rest on the same false (“individualistic”) premises; both ignore the radical version of a communitarian ethics that is operative in Sein und Zeit and that, Heidegger assumed, would be realized in National Socialism (see also Fritsche 2016c). Throughout his life, Löwith was, politically and philosophically, a right-wing reactionary or conservative. The mature Löwith sported a philosophy of history that had the same structure as Heidegger’s history of Being and was based on the astounding claim that there are, in addition to Heidegger’s existential nihilism, only two coherent philosophical positions, namely the (premodern) pre-Socratic cosmos thinking and the (premodern) Judeo-Christian belief in creation. As Löwith himself said in 1939, during the Weimar Republic he was completely disinterested in concrete politics, didn’t even read any newspaper, and couldn’t imagine before around 1935 that Heidegger’s philosophy could have anything to do with Nazism. Through his reading, the convinced National Socialist Heidegger became the conformist National Socialist Heidegger and from there the hero of postmodernity and singularization—a compelling example of the power of prejudice in Gadamer’s sense, on both sides of the Atlantic. By contrast, another student of Heidegger’s who was to become a philosopher, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, got in the 1950s the basics of §74 and probably also its details right (Fritsche 1999: 326). It might have helped him that he had been, like Heidegger, a convinced National Socialist. Given the wording of Löwith’s report about their conversation in Rome, Heidegger and Löwith most probably did not discuss the notion of historicity. Thus, they did not notice that they had very different ideas about it. For all this, see Fritsche 2009 = Fritsche 2014: 270-300; see also Fritsche 2014: 301-29.
5. Geschick (Destiny) in §74 of Sein und Zeit

In my view, Sheehan’s American reading of the three sentences on destiny and of §74 as a whole is ruled out by these ten problems, especially since there is a different interpretation that not only is not afflicted by any of them but even naturally and without any effort honors the criteria for interpretation implied in them. In the note 7 at the end of the first of the three sentences on destiny, Heidegger refers to §26, and he certainly does so to indicate that now he delivers on the rightist revolution he has anticipated in §26. He presents in the three sentences a key element of the rightist notion of history, uses in this context the vocabulary of the literature on community and society, and can keep all this so short because he is aware that he just summarizes two commonplaces among rightists. As I have shown with Hitler and Scheler (before he turned to the center\(^\text{15}\)) as examples, rightists at Heidegger’s time assumed that modern society was a downward plunge away from community but that at some point in this fall, the main player in history—some call it God, others fate, destiny, or providence, and still others use several of these names—having been silent until then and covered up by society, would raise its head and voice, enter the stage of history, establish itself as its ruler, and demand that society be demolished and community repeated (Fritsche 1999: 68-124). For instance, the Roman Catholic Scheler published shortly after the beginning of World War I a book of almost 500 pages, Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg (The Genius of War and the German War), an enthusiastic hymn on the war which God had sent to cancel society and re-realize through the Germans the Catholic love-community (see Fritsche 1999: 87-92). Using Schicksal where Heidegger has Geschick, the first sentence of this book runs thus:

When, at the beginning of the month of August, our German fate [unser deutsches Schicksal] took its stand before us [vor uns hintrat] like a single immense dark question and shook each individual to the core—the same fate that only a few weeks ago lay before us like a straight and well-built path and that simply embraced us without being noticed and with the insouciance and self-evidence of the space around us—it was just one single answer that echoed from all German souls [nur eine Antwort, die aus allen deutschen Seelen zurücktonte], one raised arm: Forward to sword and to victory! (see Fritsche 1999: 91)\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{15}\) See my footnote 2.

\(^{16}\) Sheehan makes fun of Fritsche’s language of the “call of destiny / fate” (Sheehan 2016: 501; see 485, 490; “call for help” is in no way my main formula). It has obviously evaded him that, according to rightists, to call is what God and destiny have been doing in German language and history—so much so that one need not say it explicitly. For instance, the assumption that fate, when it teilt itself mit, calls is presupposed in the above quote from Scheler by the phrase, “that simply embraced us without being noticed and […]”, (because this sentence implies that, before the beginning of August, fate was silent and did not talk) and by the phrase, “just one single answer that echoed from all German souls,” for an answer presupposes an utterance to which it answers.

In his list of the members of “the chorus of callers” (Sheehan 2016: 501) in §74, Sheehan ignores my analysis of the different steps in §74 (Fritsche 1999: 1-28, 37-68; see the summary 124-142). He maintains that §74 follows the same trajectory as the call of conscience in the section on conscience (§§54-60) does and is its last step (Sheehan 2016: 494-98, Sheehan 2015a: 158-188). However, as he himself notes, the word “call” does not occur at all in §74 (Sheehan 2016: 494). Thus, it is possible that the call of destiny in §74 (which need not be explicitly mentioned but which is acknowledged in Heidegger’s sentence with “erwidernt” [see the end of my section 2]) is wholly different from the call of conscience. However, as I pointed out, §74 is indeed the last step within one and the same narrative and therefore the call of conscience and the one of destiny will not be unrelated to each other and might even be the same at different stages of the narrative. Sheehan’s authentic Dasein is concerned only about itself (“Dasein is being loyal to nothing other than itself, its own ex-sistence” [Sheehan 2016: 496]). In his
This sentence, too, clearly shows that fate or destiny is not produced by those whose fate it is; that it rather precedes them; that without being noticed it embraces or guides them; and that at some point it makes itself known to them and raises demands that shall be obeyed, in this case to launch a war in order to re-realize the Catholic love-community (see also the context of the quote [Fritsche 1999: 90-92]). It was a commonplace among rightists that being-with-one-another in general or “authentic” being-with-one-another in particular was not a matter of subjects, of individuals as persons, of society (e.g., Tönnies 1957: 37-40, 64-67 = Tönnies 1979: 7-10, 34-36). Fully in this vein, Heidegger says, for instance, in a speech in May 1934, “community [is produced through] allegiance, the binding of oneself to the will of the leader [i.e., Hitler, J. F.]” and not through “society as a unit reckoned together out of singulars [die aus Einzelnen zusammengerechnete Einheit der Gesellschaft]” (Heidegger 2000a: 284; see Fritsche 2014: 314). In addition, it was a commonplace that destiny, the main player in history, is certainly not dependent on individuals and their fates. Heidegger makes these two points by using this time around a variation of Tönnies’ formula for community (“does not put itself together out of [its parts]”; Tönnies: “is not put together by the parts”; see my section 3 and the beginning of my section 4). Destiny (or, as Scheler says in the quoted passage, fate) is not dependent on the individuals; to the contrary it guides their fates—just as in Scheler, before and after it makes itself known to the individuals—as Heidegger says in the second of the three sentences on destiny, another commonplace among rightists (see the beginning of my section 4). Finally, at some point in time destiny teilt sich mit, communicates itself to Dasein, and enters openly the stage of history to call the individuals into the Kampf. Thus, it and its power are appropriately the grammatical subjects of the first and the third sentence (and it is for many right-wingers self-evidently the actor in the second sentence) and not “we” as in Sheehan’s perversion of the whole passage. In this case, too, one sentence is enough because Heidegger can rely on that at least those who know the relevant literature know what he is talking about, especially since in the next step of the narrative he elaborates on this Kampf: it is an

utterly naïve, because exclusively Christian-Augustinian (with a dash of Sartre, of course), interpretation of anxiety, running forward into (and not anticipation of) death (see Fritsche 1999: 1-7 and often; Fritsche 2014: 301-29), and the call of conscience in Sein und Zeit (Sheehan 2015a: 158-78). Sheehan completely misses all those features by means of which Heidegger makes clear that running forward into death and the authentic understanding of the call of conscience open up not only Dasein’s own authentic possibilities but also those of the other Daseins and are indeed a first step, but a step into the community of the people. In the 1930s, Heidegger adduced as examples of his notion of running forward into death the German soldiers in World War I who, in his view, fought for National Socialism. This is the non-trivial side of his theory of death, a right-wing call for solidarity, against the “jealous agreements / arrangements / settlements / stipulations [eifersüchtigen Verabredungen]” of the liberals and the “talkative fraternizing [redseligen Verbrüderungen]” on the left (BTS: 274 = SZ 298; addition of the three words before “stipulations” is mine, J. F.) (see Fritsche 1999: 236f. [endn. 17], Fritsche 2012: 262-66, 272-74, Fritsche 2014: 57-70, 301-29).

17 For the life-long fate of democracy, liberalism, and “Americanism,” Heidegger, the ratification of the U.S. Constitution of 1789 was most probably an example of the constitution of a society and not of a community.

18 Sheehan finds my talk of heritage, destiny, or the Volksgemeinschaft providing “slots” for the individuals weird (Sheehan 2016: 501). It goes without saying that I don’t mean that Heidegger assumes that destiny guides, or determines, every single step of an individual. Rather, it is a matter of, say, that one becomes aware whether one belongs to the two or three philosophy professors that alone, according to Heidegger, shall be kept in Nazi-Germany (Fritsche 1999: 142) or to which of the three services that Heidegger distinguishes in his rectorate address one belongs. Since destiny is not at the mercy of individuals and their fates, pace Sheehan (Sheehan 2015: 383, Sheehan 2016: 508 n. 76) Faye is right when he says as a paraphrase of the first of the three sentences on destiny that it does not reposer sur the individual fates.
Erwiderung in the sense of compliance with the command of the Volksgemeinschaft to re-realize it by a destruction, a Widerruf, of society—or, more precisely, to re-realize the “spirit” of community (or, in Tönnies’ Aristotelean vocabulary, its “form”) and the destruction of the “spirit” (or of the “form”) of society (SZ: 386.4–6 = BTM: 438.1–4; see the end of my section 2); in other words, Heidegger was, like Hitler and Scheler a revolutionary rightist, one who claimed that the repeated community could, and should, integrate parts that, historically, had emerged along with society, in the first place modern technology as opposed to nostalgic rightists who wanted to repeat the community in the way it had been when it was real (see the summary Fritsche 1999: 124–142; for “spirit” see Fritsche 1999: XII, 18–21, 70, 127–29, 134f.).

In brief, Heidegger summarizes here what rightists perceived as the kairos-situation of World War I and the Weimar Republic. It fits into the picture that, during his tenure as rector of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger frequently used the word Kampf for his activities (see, e.g., Fritsche 1999: 189 with 308 [endn. 1], Heidegger 2000a: 96, 98, 99, 114, 772) and said, for instance, in a speech in May 1934—almost exactly one year after the so-called Bücherverbrennung, the burning of the books written by Jews and of other “un-German” literature on May 10, 1933, in twenty-two German university-cities or -towns—that everything related to the pseudo-world of the Weimar Republic “must be burned all the way down to the last and most hidden branches [bis in seine letzten und verstecktesten Äste ausgebrannt]” (Heidegger 2000a: 282). In addition, πόλεμος (war, battle, contest) in Heraclitus’ fragment B 53 is, as Heidegger claims in 1933/34, not about “friendly opponents” but about the “foe [Feind]”; the foe within a people is much more dangerous than a foe outside of the people, and the Germans have “to launch the attack on a long-term basis with the goal of the total annihilation [völligen Vernichtung] of the foe,”20 this foe being most probably the Jews, for Heidegger the incarnation of society (see Fritsche 2016b).

In the lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics in summer 1935, he formulates the same idea of a revolution thus:

As the breach [Bresche] for the opening up [Eröffnung] of Being in beings—a Being that has been set to work—the Dasein of historical humanity is an in-cident, the incident in which the violent powers of the released [losgebundenen] excessive violence of Being suddenly emerge [aufgehen] and go to work as history [ins Werk als Geschichte eingehen]. (Heidegger 2000: 174 = Heidegger 1983: 172)

Dasein as historical humanity has not freely forged this Being. Rather, in Introduction to Metaphysics and in Heidegger’s entire history of Being from its beginning around 1932 until the end of his career, it is Being itself or Geschick that delivers a revolution and a new epoch, and it does so, as the passage on Geschick and the entire §74 show, already in Sein und Zeit.

That’s why Heidegger can shortly after Hitler’s “seizure of power” say that now, as he had “anticipated” it in Sein und Zeit, “our understanding of Being is thoroughly changing from the

19 See my footnote 9.

ground up” (Heidegger 2001: 255) or that now “our Dasein has begun to ground itself in a different way of Being,” namely in “care” (Heidegger 2000a: 205) (see Fritsche 1999: 207-10). It is “Being itself” (Heidegger 2000: 174 = Heidegger 1983: 171) that aufgeht, sich mitteilt, sich eröffnet, or ins Werk als Geschichte eingeht, all these phrases being variations of the noun Geschehen that he uses in Sein und Zeit for the happening of the revolution. The word “losgebunden” (literally, “unbound [from the shackles by which it had been bound until then]”) implies, just like the expression wurd frei, that Being and its excessive violence already exist before the moment in which they are released. In Sein und Zeit as well as in Introduction to Metaphysics and Heidegger’s history of Being in general, it is Schein (seeming) that in a “forgetting of a forgetting” (Fritsche 1999: 204 and often) keeps Being bound. In Sein und Zeit, in particular, Heidegger emphasizes—just as Scheler had done (Fritsche 1999: 106-8)—that Geschick or the community of the people already announces itself in some scat-tered phenomena and silent calls under the surface which the They, seeming, or society tries to neutralize and render insignificant (see in the summary Fritsche 1999: 130-32) before it fi-nally “constitutes itself / puts itself together” (SZ: 383; Staumbaugh’s “is […] constituted” [BTS: 351] turns in the spirit of the American interpretation of §74 the sentence upside down [see Fritsche 1999: 263 {endn. 2}]) out of these phenomena and establishes itself as the main player in history, with “constitutes itself” as another name for the Geschehen of the revolution (see Fritsche 1999: 43-67).

Being eröffnet sich and makes Dasein its agent and executor, as Heidegger elaborates upon in Introduction to Metaphysics after the citation with the breach in an interpretation of νοείν (apprehension) and λόγος (logos) in Parmenides and Heraclitus. If one replaces in his summary of this line of thought and of his interpretation of Parmenides and Heraclitus (Heidegger 2000: 185 = Heidegger 1983: 182) “λόγος” with “heritage [Erbe],” “the gatheredness of Being [Gesammtetheit des Seins]” with “authentic historizing of the German people,” “Selective ‘gleaning’ [auslesende ‘Lesen’]” with “Erwiderung and Widerruf,” “Being [Sein]” with “the German Volksgemeinschaft,” and “seeming [Schein]” with “liberal and democratic Gesellschaft,” the summary is an excellent abstract of §74 of Sein und Zeit (see Fritsche 1999: 199-203)—stand at attention, Sheehan, Pégny’s Being as Deckname is looking at you (or läßt grüssen [sends its regards]) (see also Fritsche 2014: 207-210 and Fritsche 2016c).

6. Sheehan’s “Coda” and “Notes” on Fritsche

Sheehan does not discuss anything in these two sections either. Rather, as though he were an automatic puppet or a shooting-machine, he just says, “wrong,” (Sheehan 2016: 517f.) followed by a negation of my claim or a repetition of his own opinion. One of these repetitions, however, is very longwinded and comes in several steps, the one on the translation of the word Bodenlosigkeit (absence of soil, groundlessness), which Heidegger uses in Sein und Zeit eight times. In my first paper on Sheehan, I have shown that he is wrong in his claim that Heidegger always means the groundlessness of a philosophical position. Rather, one just has to look up the respective sentences to realize at first sight and without any thought that in five or even seven cases Heidegger uses it as the label for what he regards to be the uprootedness of the (modern) They and that he uses it only once for the groundlessness of a philosophical position, at which point, in addition, hequalifies the word (“lack of ontological foundation
ontologische Bodenlosigkeit]” [BT 412 n. 19 = SZ: 320 n. 19], quite obviously to indicate that this is a special usage (Fritsche 2016: 434-40). In addition, I argue that, as it evades Sheehan, the occurrences of Bodenlosigkeit, Entwurzelung (uprootedness), and Bodenständigkeit (the having-of-a-firm-stand-on-the-Boden, the opposite of Bodenlosigkeit) in Sein und Zeit mark the intrusion of right-wing parlance into the philosophical vocabulary (Fritsche 2016: 434-40). Finally, I support Faye’s French translation of Bodenlosigkeit as absence de sol (absence of soil) when the word occurs, as it does in Heidegger, in politically right-wing texts (Fritsche 2016: 440-42). Sheehan does not present any of these three points, let alone discuss them. Rather, he continues, like a cornered child, his senseless tirade, begun in his paper on Faye (Sheehan 2015: 384-86), about an instance of Bodenlosigkeit in a citation from Count Yorck (SZ: 401.2 = BTS: 366.3)—as though this sentence of that Count would be of any relevance to what according to Sheehan himself (Sheehan 2016: 482) is at stake, namely the relation between Heidegger’s philosophy and his National Socialism and anti-Semitism.

Sheehan deals in the paper from 2016 with Bodenlosigkeit for the first time in the part on Pégny where he repeats his charges against Faye (Sheehan 2016: 505f.) and ascribes to me the opinion that, in the two occurrences of Boden in volumes 17 and 18 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, the word means “the earth as arable soil” (Sheehan 2016: 506), even though I have at no point in my paper from 2016 or anywhere else talked about these two instances. He refers as proof of his claim to Fritsche 2016: 438.39 (Sheehan 2016: 506 n. 69) where, however, I refer to usages of Boden in which the word definitely means “the earth as arable soil” in a speech of Heidegger’s from 1925 and in a passage in his Black Notebooks from shortly after Hitler’s “seizure of power” both of which I had quoted earlier (Fritsche 2016: 435). In addition, he says with reference to Fritsche 2016: 437.28-37 that “[e]ven Fritsche accepts ‘groundlessness’” (Sheehan 2016: 505 n. 65) as the appropriate English translation of Bodenlosigkeit in Sein und Zeit. The strategic aspect of this remark becomes obvious in his second treatment of Bodenlosigkeit, in “2.1.2 Coda: On Fritsche’s Mistranslation of Bodenlosigkeit” (Sheehan 2016: 507).

Here he says that I am “irredeemably wrong” (Sheehan 2016: 507) about the citation from Count Yorck in SZ: 401.2 (= BTS: 366.3), and this on four accounts, for there is “absolutely no evidence” 1) that “Heidegger used Bodenlosigkeit at all in §77”; 2) that he “used Bodenlosigkeit anywhere in SZ to mean ‘absence of soil’”; 3) that he “used Bodenlosigkeit anywhere in SZ as a slur against Jews”; and 4) that “Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg […] used either Bodenlosigkeit or bodenlos in §77 as a racial slur directed at Jews for their alleged lack of ‘rootedness in the soil’” (Sheehan 2016: 507). Thus, if “[e]ven” the native speaker of German, Fritsche, accepts “groundlessness” as the appropriate English translation of Bodenlosigkeit in Sein und Zeit, the Frenchman Pégny should do so, too; and if Pégny and Fritsche have to recognize that Bodenlosigkeit in the quote from Count Yorck does not mean “absence of soil,” Pégny and Fritsche have to admit that they are wrong and that, rather, Sheehan is right with his claim that Bodenlosigkeit means everywhere in Sein und Zeit “groundlessness,” the groundlessness, in addition, of a philosophical position. Sheehan does not give any reference to any text of mine except in a note at the end of 4): “Fritsche goes so far as to say ‘the soil [...] of Being and Time is völkisch”: Fritsche 1999: XV.29.” (Sheehan 2016: 507 n. 74) This sentence of eight words is his proof that I entertain 1), 2), 3), and 4) and not only that but even go further. Readers of pages XVf. in the Preface of Fritsche 1999 will see that I don’t make there
any claim regarding Heidegger’s usage of \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} and that I compare the decontextualizing Heidegger interpretations after World War II and in Deconstructionism with gardeners who arbitrarily relocate plants in order, for my part, to plea for a philology of humility that studies the plants in their native habitat.

Sheehan cannot give any reference because I have never said any of these things. First, I mention in Fritsche 2016 Sheehan’s obsession with the quotation from Count Yorck (Fritsche 2016: 434), but I don’t discuss at any point, neither in Fritsche 2016 nor anywhere else, this quote or any other aspect of §77. Thus, it is impossible that I say that 1) Heidegger uses \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} in §77 or 4) that Count Yorck uses it in §77 as a racial slur (Sheehan 2016: 507). Second, in Fritsche 2016: 437.28-37 and its context I quote in Macquarrie’s and Robinson’s translation the passages containing \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} to probe Sheehan’s claim that Heidegger uses it always in the sense of the groundlessness of a philosophical position. As I already mentioned, one sees at first sight and without any thought that Sheehan is wrong. In addition, one sees this without being in any way in need to decide what \textit{Boden} in \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} in these instances means. For the several reasons that I adduce, I say that it is probable that, when Heidegger uses \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} for the They, he privately—or “esoterically” (Fritsche 2016: 439)—thinks also or even mainly of not-being-rooted-in-the-soil, but I don’t say anywhere 2) that Heidegger “used \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} anywhere in SZ to mean ‘absence of soil’” (Sheehan 2016: 507). In addition, I quote in Fritsche 2016 a remark of Heidegger in his \textit{Black Notebooks} on the \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} of the Jews (Fritsche 2016: 435f.), but I don’t say at any point, neither in Fritsche 2016 nor anywhere else, that 3) he uses “\textit{Bodenlosigkeit} anywhere in SZ as a slur against Jews” (Sheehan 2016: 507). It speaks, by the way, neither against authors nor against interpreters if, in such cases, they don’t want to, or cannot, fully specify the meaning of a word. Everyone knows that, in everyday life, the humanities, and in politics, a word that is used polemically often gets ridiculous if its meaning is highly specified.

As though these two rounds were not enough, Sheehan returns to the issue in his “Notes” on me, recycles four times the Yorck quote (Sheehan 2016: 517, 517, 518, 518), and cites me: “Sheehan does not tell us what Harries said about the meaning of \textit{Bodenlosigkeit},” (Sheehan 2016: 517; I have “readers,” not “us” [Fritsche 2016: 440]) My sentence refers to Sheehan’s remark in his paper on Faye that, in a private conversation in the context of a conference on the \textit{Black Notebooks} in New York in September 2014, “Professor Karsten Harries, who is a native speaker of German […] , pointed out the meaning of \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} to Faye” and thus “demolished Faye’s claim about ‘absence of soil’ on elementary philological grounds” (Sheehan 2015: 383). Sheehan manages (even without saying anything about the weather on that remarkable evening in Midtown Manhattan) to spend a quarter of a page informing readers about inessential aspects of that conversation (“dinner at ‘Stella 34 Trattoria’ (151 W 34th St.)” [Sheehan 2016: 517]) to conclude: “For further details Fritsche might want to contact Karsten Harries” (Sheehan 2016: 518), followed by Harries’ postal address in Connecticut. Indeed, it would be interesting to hear Professor Harries, not the least because—to engage on my part once in that sort of nitpicking that Sheehan seems to love and in which he gets so much wrong—Sheehan seems to have misunderstood him. While in Sheehan’s paper on Faye, Harries explained “the meaning of \textit{Bodenlosigkeit}” (Sheehan 2015: 383), in the paper on Pégy, Rastier, and me he just pointed out that the “correct translation” of \textit{Bodenlosigkeit} (SZ: 401.2 [the Count Yorck quote, J. F.]) is “groundlessness” and not “absence of
required” (Sheehan 2016: 517). Anyway, scholarship à la Sheehan means obviously to pervert Heidegger’s German vocabulary and text, to pervert secondary literature through omissions, manipulations, and absurd allegations, and to insult and ridicule authors who—in contrast to his authoritarian procedure, with the support of arguments—offer something that lies beyond his horizon.

7. Conclusion

As I explained in the preceding section, in my first paper on Sheehan I have shown that all his claims regarding Heidegger’s usage of *Bodenlosigkeit* and related issues in *Sein und Zeit* in his paper on Faye are false (Fritsche 2016: 434-42). As to §74 of *Sein und Zeit*, Sheehan misquotes Heidegger and has a backfiring apparition of Goethe. In addition, like almost all American interpreters since Richardson’s book from 1963, he claims, in the “spirit” of the American self-made man, that Heidegger says that Dasein creates its own *Schicksal* (fate). Sheehan is aware that such usage flies flatly in the face of its normal one, for in everyday parlance *Schicksal* is used for something that one better accepts since it is inescapable (and, for rightists, to accept one’s fate relieves Dasein from the burden of liberal autonomy and opens up a world of trust, love, etc., the world of the *Volksgemeinschaft* [community of the people]).

Sheehan tries to smooth away this oddity by claiming that Heidegger used *Schicksal* with the word *schicklich* in view. However, he obviously does not understand this word (Fritsche 2016: 430-34). In sum, since each of the points Sheehan adduces speaks against him and for Faye, his critique of Faye’s interpretation of *Sein und Zeit* and therefore—according to his own assessment (Sheehan 2015: 383; see Fritsche 2016: 443 n. 2)—of Faye’s book as a whole lacks any foundation.

Heidegger uses in §74 *Schicksal* with regard to the individual and *Geschick* (destiny) for the community. *Geschick* is the coming out of the *Volksgemeinschaft* as the main player in history, and it demands that the Daseins cancel society and repeat, re-realize, the *Volksgemeinschaft*. In my current paper, it turns out that, according to Sheehan (who might have been alerted to the notion of destiny only through Faye’s book), Heidegger also says that the Daseins freely forge their destiny, their common fate. In this case, too, Sheehan is aware that such usage is the opposite of its usual one, in which *Geschick* means, just as fate, something inescapable, but this time around he does not make any effort to soften this peculiarity. What is more, as in the case of *Schicksal* and *Geschick* based on a consistently “subjectivist” mis-reading of Heidegger’s vocabulary that turns it upside down, he claims that Heidegger employs not just *Schicksal* and *Geschick* but also all the other key terms in §74 (*Überlieferung*, *Gewesen*, and *Wiederholung*) in ways that are the direct opposite of their everyday meanings or otherwise highly unfamiliar—even though Heidegger uses all these terms in *Sein und Zeit* outside of §74 in their everyday understanding and even though, in §74, he indicates at no point that he would use any of them in an extraordinary fashion. This is extremely improbable or simply impossible. In addition, even if one grants Sheehan Heidegger’s private language, his interpretation is, as I showed with reference to the three sentences on *Geschick* in §74, also for other reasons highly unlikely or impossible. By contrast, my interpretation of §74 does not require any private language on Heidegger’s part and fulfils all the other criteria regarding
which Sheehan fails. (In addition, I pointed out some of Sheehan’s numerous absurd insinuations regarding my interpretations and his (most probably, deliberate mishandlings of quotes.) Hence, being wrong about all the issues he adduces, his critique of my book is entirely void as well.

As to the issue of translation, Macquarrie, Robinson, and Stambaugh have, pace Sheehan, properly translated the terms on his (in part, incorrect) list (Sheehan 2016: 486f.). In fact, they have mistranslated in the spirit of the self-made man some sentences in §74 and thereby paved the way for its “American” interpretation. However, in these cases Sheehan did not interfere but adopted their mistranslations. Has Sheehan through his own translations and interpretation guided scholars out of the dark into which, in his view, Macquarrie, Robinson, and Stambaugh “have misled [them] for over fifty years” (Sheehan 2016: 487)? In no way, to the contrary—unless one says that, with his interpretations of fate along the lines of a midlife crisis and of destiny as pertaining to issues, such as the founding of a rabbit breeders association, readers have reached the end of the wood-path of triviality where one can no longer avoid the thought that this cannot have been what the epochal thinker had reserved for, as Sheehan says, the “emphatic climax” (Sheehan 2015: 381) of his most influential work.

As Sheehan informs readers in the Foreword of Making Sense of Heidegger, his three sons suggested that it is about time that I move on beyond the narrow confines of Heidegger scholarship into the wider world of philosophical discourse and into the arguably more pressing issues—economic, social, and political—that call for one’s attention. (Sheehan 2015a: XIII)

Having finished his chef-d’œuvre, seventy-five years old Sheehan feels up to the task:

I agree. But I want to be sure that when I move beyond Heidegger, it is Heidegger that I am moving beyond, and not a caricature of his philosophy. (Sheehan 2015a: XIII)

To honor the impact of William J. Richardson, S. J., on him Sheehan adapts Alexander Pope (“Nature and Nature’s Laws lay hid in Night / God said, ‘Let Newton be!’ and all was light.’):

Heidegger and all his works lay hid in night.
God said “Let Richardson be!” and all was light. (Sheehan 2015a: XI)

Here is another adaptation:

Heidegger and all the world lay deep in sorrow.
God said “Let Sheehan come,
and things will be fine by tomorrow!”

Sheehan contributes, with the full force of italics, an insight to the theory of interpretation:

Having German as one’s native tongue is not always an advantage with Heidegger’s philosophy, and it can even be a disadvantage. Over and above a command of German, one must also have a philosophical understanding of what Heidegger’s technical terms
denote when they diverge from their ordinary German meanings. And that understanding is precisely what Fritsche lacks. (Sheehan 2016: 487)²¹

As one sees, his three sons have, hermeneutically, something more substantial to offer: when one knows only one thing, one knows nothing—neither oneself nor the They in which one is living,²² nor the author to whom one has dedicated one’s professional life and of whose work one has produced a trivial "caricature" (Sheehan 2015a: XIII), a strawman of one’s own pre-judgments.²³

Being, as though he were the most naïve analytic philosopher imaginable, completely deaf to the problems that in particular the internationally well-known philosopher and Heidegger student Hans-Georg Gadamer has developed in his writings none of which occurs in the bibliography of Making Sense of Heidegger, Sheehan makes fun of Fritsche for allegedly assuming that, again with italics, "it would take over seventy years before the true meaning of SZ would finally […] spring fully formed from the forehead of Professor Fritsche" (Sheehan 2016: 503). As to the political aspects of Sein und Zeit, I have addressed this issue in an article on Karl Löwith²⁴ and suggested some more aspects in Geschichtlichkeit und Nationalsozialismus in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Fritsche 2014: 299-300). I don’t mention there the main reason regarding the “many diligent scholars” (Sheehan 2016: 503) in the United States of America, namely their limited horizon comprising only authors, such as Derrida and Nietzsche (or, for that matter, Jesus Christ and St. Augustine), but without the type of literature one needs to know to discuss the political implications of Heidegger’s texts. Sheehan is a case in point. The aggressive self-complacency that each page of his papers breathes, his cheating in the cheapest and silliest ways, and the other features that I mentioned at the beginning of my

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²¹ Sheehan makes no effort to explain how he recognizes when Heidegger’s usage of a word differs from common parlance. Given his blessed hermeneutical incompetence and arrogance, he would probably not be able to say anything reasonable on this issue.

²² It has apparently evaded Sheehan (see Sheehan 2016: 519) that the idea of the self-made man is ingrained in the They of the United States of America. He rather seems to assume that Heidegger was the first to articulate it—from the viewpoint of a theology well established in some areas of the American They, in the theologically correct fashion, namely with special emphasis on the finitude and mortality of Dasein—and that he, Sheehan, is (with some help from Richardson [Richardson 2003: 90-93], to whom he also owes the perversity of the notion of Schicksal [see Sheehan 2016: 493]), the first to recognize this brilliant thought of the thinker. Sheehan is most certainly not aware either that the idea of the “ugly American”—of which, judged according to his papers on Faye et al., he is certainly an excellent example—is widespread in many Theys outside the United States. For instance, here in Istanbul my wife and I are most often the only ones to defend them and say good things about their citizens.

²³ Being a professor of philosophy only by courtesy, Sheehan checks the professional pedigree of “The Twenty-One” (Sheehan 2016: 524) who signed Rastier’s “An Open Letter” (Rastier 2016); there are professors of semiotics etc. but only four professors of philosophy! (Sheehan 2016: 525) Two of them, Fritsche and Quesada, have written a book on Heidegger, but are incompetent (Sheehan 2016: 525), and “neither Ferraris nor Azzara has a book on Heidegger” (Sheehan 2016: 525). Thus, in Sheehan’s beloved italics, “none of them has published a philosophical monograph on Heidegger, i.e., a book that would pass muster as philosophy.” (Sheehan 2016: 525) To work on Heidegger one has to have written a book on him, a philosophical one, and have read him throughout one’s professional life. Obviously, Sheehan is incapable of acknowledging the advice of his sons. In German, one would call him a Fachidioten, an expert-idiot, an idiot of an expert, or something like that. More importantly, it has completely evaded him that the letter was in the first place about something else, namely about academic conduct or civilized behaviour in general. Sheehan will declare that one has to have written a philosophical book on Heidegger to say something on this issue.

²⁴ See my footnote 14.
paper certainly don’t help—it is sad to see an old man close to the end of his career ruin whatever reputation he has.

Hopefully, Sheehan is deliberately lying with all his false accusations against Faye et al. (To vary that French bon mot [Sheehan 2016: 516], better a scoundrel than an idiot.) Streetwalking (“faire le trottoir” [Sheehan 2016: 514 n. 90] as, according to Sheehan, Rastier does for Faye) for the Nazi and anti-Semite Heidegger and cynically relying on that hardly anyone checks citations, he simply wants to discredit Faye et al. and administer two heavy-duty feel-well shots for all those of his fellow Heideggerians who are distressed by the political conviction and racism of their hero. For any impartial observer, Sheehan’s two boorish and fraudulent papers are, ethically and scholarly, certainly unter aller Sau (extremely bad; literally, below each and any sow), a disgrace to any serious journal. Nevertheless, the editor of Philosophy Today, Peg Birmingham, published them, the second already in the same issue as my paper to which it responds; she initially refused to publish a response of mine to his second paper, and if Sheehan wishes so, readers of Philosophy Today will have to endure a further paper of his. I, for my part, will most probably not respond to any future text of Sheehan on Faye et al. unless he honors proper academic conduct. Sheehan labels “this important debate” (Birmingham 2016: 427) “L’affaire Faye” (Sheehan 2016: 481). It should better be called “The affaire Sheehan / Birmingham”—Thomas Sheehan, the toothless pit bull and Donald Trump of American Heideggerianism? Or, for the professor of religious studies and expert at theologians in the Heideggerian cast, as one more Pope knockoff and in vindication of his propagation of his idea about Fritsche’s scatological humor:

Heidegger’s NS and anti-Semitism

lay deeply hid

until FF and others

removed the lid,

God said: “S***!

I’ll send my gorgeous pit-bull team

and Heidegger’s fans will happily beam.”

To end on a pleasant note, Reiner Schürmann was, along with Derrida, the only truly creative amongst the Heideggerians, and he had, as he told me once, his opinion about Sheehan: Shannee Marks is producing a documentary on Schürmann (working title: “Traces of

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25 In a paper from 1995, I showed that Heidegger was by no means silent about the Holocaust but rather tried in “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954) to “silence Auschwitz silently” (Fritsche 1995: 155). The Black Notebooks confirm my argument (see Fritsche 2016b). According to my experience, Heideggerians and deconstructionists are incomparably more prone to (consciously) mishandle and even pervert quotes. The latest confirmation of this impression owes to Peter Trawny, the editor of the Black Notebooks and, just like Sheehan, a “silent listener[s]” (Sheehan 2016: 517) to the conversation in which Harries “demolished […] on elementary philological grounds” (Sheehan 2015: 383) Faye’s claim regarding Bodenlosigkeit. Heidegger writes in the Black Notebooks around 1938/9 that his insight into his deception about the essence and historical role of the empirical National Socialism of his days has led him to the recognition of the “true,” timeless, National Socialism. In other words, in 1938/9 he discovered the “true” National Socialism and became the true National Socialist. Trawny presents this passage as Heidegger’s abandonment of each and any National Socialism (see Fritsche 2016a: 593-94).

26 See my footnote 3.
Reiner Schürmann”). Anyone who thinks they could contribute something might contact her at kylemore38@hotmail.com.

Postscript

After the publication of Sheehan’s paper on Faye (Sheehan 2015) in Philosophy Today 59(3) (2015), the editor, Peg Birmingham, published in Philosophy Today 59(4) an open letter by François Rastier et al. (Rastier 2015) and in Philosophy Today 60(2) (2016) Gaëtan Pégny’s response to Sheehan 2015 (Pégny 2016) and Fritsche’s response to Sheehan 2015 (Fritsche 2016). In the same issue, she already published a paper of Sheehan (Sheehan 2016) with his attack on Fritsche 1999 (Fritsche’s book on Heidegger from 1999) and his response to Fritsche 2016, Pégny 2016, and Rastier 2016. Since Faye’s response to Sheehan 2015 was also scheduled for Philosophy Today 60(2) (see Birmingham 2016: 427), Sheehan and Birmingham most probably thought that, in Sheehan 2016, Sheehan would respond not only to Rastier et al., Pégny, and Fritsche but also to Faye and, in this way, have the last word. However, this plan did not work out since Faye’s rejoinder to Sheehan 2015 was not ready in time (see Birmingham 2016: 427) and will be published only in Philosophy Today 60(4). In July 2016 Birmingham refused Fritsche’s request to publish a response of his to Sheehan 2016, about which he informed the members of the editorial board of Philosophy Today and her colleagues at the Department of Philosophy at DePaul University, the official publisher of Philosophy Today. In August, she allowed Fritsche a rejoinder of 14 pages. When she sent her the current paper cut down to 10,700 words (and without “Birmingham” in the title), she refused to publish it unless he shortens it by 2,000 words and—in light of her editorial note (Birmingham 2016: 427), a clear case of censorship—completely deletes its last paragraph (“Hopefully […] at kylemore38@hotmail.com.”); with “leaning” and “to endure a third paper of his on what he labels” in the place of “conviction” and of “to endure a further paper of his. I, for […] (Birmingham 2016: 427)” and the notes and the phrases “as, according […] Faye,” “literally, […] sow,” “Or, for […] beam’,” and “as he […] once” as later additions). Subsequently, she rejected as well his suggestion to publish the 10,700-word paper without that last paragraph. At the end of “this important debate” (Birmingham 2016: 427), Pégny, Rastier, and Fritsche will each have one paper only (Pégny 2016, Rastier 2016, Fritsche 2016), without the opportunity to respond to Sheehan’s response to them, Faye will have one paper only as well (namely his response to Sheehan’s 2015 to be published in Philosophy Today 60[4]), Sheehan has already two, namely his attack on Faye (Sheehan 2015) and his response to Pégny, Rastier, and Fritsche (Sheehan 2016), and Philosophy Today will, if he wishes so, publish a third paper of his, his response to Faye’s response to Sheehan 2015 (and to whomever else he wants to respond once more).
Bibliography

Note the abbreviations I use for Heidegger 1962, 1972, and 1996.


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